
WOODLAND, CA – Deputy District Attorney Ashley Harvey claimed, at a preliminary hearing in Yolo County Superior Court Thursday, an officer’s actions that led to the arrest of the accused were reasonable, despite defense claims there was a lack of evidence or reasonable suspicion.
The accused was charged with two felonies for illegally carrying a concealed firearm and one misdemeanor for a suspended license after being pulled over on I-80.
The arresting officer stated in court the accused had been driving at a high speed, following too closely to another car, and had tinted windows that were too dark, and that was enough to make the arrest.
District Public Defender Danielle Craig argued it was DDA Harvey’s burden to prove the violations alleged against the accused, and the officer would not have been able to identify the 88 percent light transmittance of the tinted window with the naked eye.
DPD Craig also challenged the validity of the stop and contended that the officer lacked reasonable suspicion—the legal standard required for a traffic stop.
DPD Craig added an officer would not have been able to make a traffic stop based on the initial information. The officer had no photos of the front windows that were claimed to have been too dark, and the darkness of tinted windows is permissible if following the 88% light transmittance or having exemptions because of a medical condition.
DPD Craig also said the accused was “appropriately driving” at the same rate as the other cars on the road at the time, and argued there was a “reasonable conclusion that (the accused) was not speeding.”
The defense also charged the officer did not have a speed radar in the car at the time of the traffic stop.
The officer’s third reason for pulling over the accused was that the driver was driving too close to the car in front of him, but DPD Craig declared there was no evidence that proved the accused had been following the car too closely.
DPD Craig explained the accused did not brake at all while following the car, indicating that the accused was not “too close.”
DPD Craig alleged the officer had violated the 4th Amendment by searching the accused’s car without probable cause, and an inventory search “cannot be a ruse for rummaging around,” suggesting the officer was searching for evidence instead of following proper inventory procedures.
“The court can and should conclude the inventory search was improper,” asserted DPD Craig, who noted the officer did not ask if the accused would like to take anything of his from the car before it was towed, if there was anyone that could take the car, or list the location of the car on the CHP 180 form.
DDA Harvey refuted the defense claims, arguing the officer did report a “black window tint” and the officer personally observed the window tint. DDA Harvey suggested the tint of the car was well-indicated by the officer to warrant a traffic stop.
DDA Harvey explained the reason why the CHP 180 form did not list the location of the car and no one was contacted to pick up the car was because the officer wanted to work quickly to get the car off of the side of the highway.
DDA Harvey noted the accused had “no proof of a medical condition” which would permit him to have dark tinted windows.
DPD Craig refuted DDA Harvey’s statements, and insisted “there was no evidence of bumper pacing—no radar was used.”
DPD Craig added DDA Harvey improperly shifted the burden of proof and emphasized that it was the prosecution’s responsibility to justify the traffic stop rather than the accused’s obligation to prove a medical exemption.
Judge Sonia Cortés agreed the officer “did not follow everything in the policy manual,” but ruled the officer had not violated CHP protocol and held the accused to stand trial on all charges.
Judge Cortés did reduce the charges, reducing both felony Counts One and Two to misdemeanors and cited the accused’s limited criminal history, young age, and compliance with the arresting officer during the traffic stop as mitigating factors.
The accused is set to appear for a pretrial conference on April 14, where further proceedings will determine the next steps in the case.