Defense Argues Pattern of Official Overreach in Ajay Dev’s Habeas Case

Defense Builds Case for Relief, Asserts Pattern of Official Overreach

After several years of hearing evidence—on and off—in matters that have been interrupted by both the pandemic as well as witness availability, Judge Janene Beronio heard the closing arguments in the Habeas hearing for Ajay Dev—convicted in 2009 and sentenced to 378 years in prison.

In her closing argument, Attorney Jennifer Mouzis, arguing on behalf of Ajay Dev, painted a stark contrast between the burden of proof required under California’s revised habeas corpus law and what she called the prosecution’s “transactional” use of justice to preserve a conviction at any cost.

 “Contrary to respondent’s position,” Mouzis argued, “the truth matters and should be carefully considered by the court… The California legislature explicitly removed the heightened burden Respondent seeks to apply to these habeas proceedings.”

She pointed to Senate Bill 1134 and the changes it made to Penal Code § 1473, clarifying that a petitioner need only show that new evidence is “sufficiently material and credible that it more likely than not would have changed the outcome”—not that it undermines the entire prosecution. 

“The standard is clear,” she said, criticizing the prosecution for misstating the law and ignoring that the Attorney General’s own office helped draft the final closing brief.

Mouzis framed the prosecution’s approach as one of paranoia and cultural arrogance, arguing that the state “inexplicably accused” nearly every defense witness of participating in a vast conspiracy orchestrated by Ajay Dev—with no credible evidence. “They have also inexplicably accused Dinesh Deo (a store employee), Schweta Deo (a school teacher), and Bhabendra Yadav (a retired Headmaster) of being a part of the conspiracy,” Mouzis argued. “They threatened Sanjay Dev and Sangita Dev without evidence… depriving Mr. Dev of all available evidence.”

She noted that the state’s reflexive suspicion extended even to respected legal professionals. “They have privately attacked Cliff Gardner—one of the most respected and successful appellate attorneys in the state—of being part of the conspiracy,” she argued, adding that others were targeted simply for being perceived as supportive of Dev. 

In contrast, the same prosecutors who attacked Dev’s trial attorney, Michael Rothschild, during the original trial now declared him trustworthy—only when it helped discredit the defense’s habeas claim.

Rothschild, she said, is painted as both reliable and unreliable, depending on the prosecution’s needs.

 “So, Mr. Rothschild is both very trustworthy and also vague and lacks recollection,” she noted, calling attention to contradictions in the state’s position. “He is very competent, yet failed to interview and call Dinesh Deo when there is credible evidence that Mr. Rothschild had his correct number prior to trial.”

The central accusation—of a fabricated conspiracy to introduce false evidence—was, Mouzis argued, unsubstantiated and shaped by a failure to understand cultural nuance.

“They misunderstand how individuals from other cultures speak differently than native English speakers,” she said, referring to recorded jail calls between Dev and his family. “Those from other countries have different mannerisms, cultural references, and ways of phrasing… It does not make them liars.”

As for the prosecution’s claim that Dev and his brother Sanjay created a fake Facebook message to suggest witness tampering, Mouzis argued the interpretation was not only speculative but contradicted by expert testimony. 

“They interpret it to mean they created the messages—a theory not supported by Lt. Skaife or Mr. Chase,” she argued. “They failed to prove that anyone created the fake page on Mr. Dev’s behalf and that Madhuri was not the extortionist behind the fake account.” 

Mouzis noted that the defense’s own expert showed how the account metadata could have been examined to clarify its origins, but that the prosecution failed to pursue this.

Similarly, Mouzis defended the testimony of Sangita and Schweta Dev, arguing their statements were coherent, consistent with other witnesses, and made without coaching—despite the prosecution’s insinuations. Schweta, for instance, testified that Sapna was angry with Mr. Dev after he removed her from his will and sent her back to Nepal.

“The prosecution, unable to point to falsehoods in her account, fell back on accusing counsel of scripting it,” Mouzis argued. “Of course, they have no proof—because in fact I never once spoke with Schweta prior to her testimony.”

Mouzis saved some of her sharpest criticism for the way the prosecution treated the pretext call, a recorded conversation used at trial. She contended that the state manipulated interpretations of the recording depending on their usefulness. When initial translations claimed the tape said “you (f-ed) me since you were 18,” they were accepted as reliable; but when improved audio revealed the phrase, “you came with me since you were 18,” the state dismissed it as meaningless.

She argued, “The respondent’s position is transactional—it is to be believed if it supports a conviction, and discounted if it does not.”

She concluded by pointing to the state’s refusal to reckon with Sapna’s own criminal conviction in Nepal for passport fraud, which directly undermined key parts of her testimony, especially relating to her age.

“They know it is true through all of the evidence adduced, but as in other instances in this case, they urge the court to ignore this and deny the petition,” Mouzis argued. “This is a particularly interesting position to take when the prosecutor’s duty is to seek justice, not convictions.”

Mount’s Case During Close

Responding to the defense, Deputy District Attorney Steven Mount struck a sharply different tone—one grounded in skepticism and an insistence on finality. Where Mouzis emphasized evolving standards of justice and cultural nuance, Mount returned repeatedly to the trial record, the presumption of guilt after conviction, and what he described as a pattern of manufactured doubt.

Mount began by urging the court to reject the petition on procedural grounds, calling it untimely and unsupported by credible evidence.

“Petitioner failed to present any evidence at all during these hearings upon which an evaluation of timeliness could be made,” he wrote. But even if the court chose to consider the merits, he argued, the claims fell short.

He focused especially on the claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. Mount pointed out that trial attorney Michael Rothschild was never asked by the defense to explain his strategy during the six-year evidentiary process, despite being present. 

“Petitioner secured Rothschild’s presence at the courthouse,” he wrote, “but then failed to call him as a witness to explain his trial strategy or alleged shortcomings.” 

The result, Mount argued, was a failure to develop even a prima facie case.

Mount then turned to the evidence that the defense claimed was new, calling it either redundant, irrelevant, or intentionally misleading. He accused Dev’s legal team and family of fabricating a Facebook message meant to suggest extortion by the complaining witness’s sister. According to Mount, forensic analysis of Facebook metadata proved the message came from a different account.

“Petitioner fabricated this argument and the Facebook Message,” he wrote, and claimed Dev and his brother Sanjay conspired to present it as real. He bolstered his case with excerpts from jail calls between the brothers discussing timestamps and account structures.

Where the defense framed these conversations as culturally misinterpreted and emotionally charged exchanges between frightened family members, Mount saw strategic manipulation. He described the calls as “persuasion,” accusing Dev of scripting witness testimony and undermining the credibility of every family member who took the stand on his behalf.

Mount also discounted the enhanced version of the pretext call—a central focus of the defense’s innocence claim—as offering no real difference. While defense translators claimed the line said “you came with me after you were 18,” Mount noted that the original translation—“you (f-ed) me since you were 18”—was more consistent with the broader conversation. He characterized the defense’s efforts to revisit the tape as “a knowingly false submission” and insisted that the choice not to enhance the tape at trial was a “strategic decision” made by a competent attorney.

He addressed the credibility of Dinesh Deo, Schweta Deo, and Bhabendra Yadav, dismissing each as either unbelievable, influenced, or irrelevant. For Deo, Mount pointed to contradictions between his testimony and prison visitation records, suggesting he fabricated a story years after the fact. 

For Schweta, Mount said she “could not stick with her script.” And for Yadav, he dismissed the retired school headmaster’s testimony that Sapna admitted to lying as a product of coaching and financial incentive.

“There was no evidence that any of the witnesses were unavailable at trial,” Mount wrote, “only that trial counsel chose not to call them.” In his view, this was not ineffective assistance—it was the avoidance of testimony that would have crumbled under cross-examination.

Perhaps the most revealing moment of Mount’s closing came not in a legal citation, but in a blunt, sweeping assertion: “I don’t really care what the legal standard was—I don’t think they proved their case at all.” For Mount, the burden of proof wasn’t just unmet—it was irrelevant, because the foundation of the petition was fundamentally flawed.

While the defense asked the court to consider a shifting landscape of justice, cultural context, and evolving standards of credibility, Mount urged the judge to hold the line. Finality, not flexibility, was the cornerstone of the prosecution’s case.

Mouzis’ Rebuttal: “The Truth Matters”

In a brief but pointed five-minute rebuttal, defense attorney Jennifer Mouzis seized on one of the most striking lines from Deputy District Attorney Steven Mount’s closing: “I don’t really care what the legal standard was.” 

Mouzis called the remark deeply revealing, arguing that it reflected not just indifference but a pattern of misrepresentation. “He misled this court on the applicable legal standard,” she said, “and now admits he doesn’t care whether it was applied correctly or not.”

Mouzis returned to the heart of the habeas petition: the disputed eight-second clip from the pretext call, which she said had been crucially enhanced after trial. At the time of Dev’s conviction, the defense had no access to a clarified version of the recording, she argued—one that significantly alters the meaning of what was said. “Those eight seconds matter,” Mouzis argued, “and they change the entire context of what the state calls an admission.”

She further pointed out that if the line in question truly reflected a confession, it would make no sense that Sapna—Dev’s adopted daughter and sole accuser—continued to plead with him to admit guilt throughout the rest of the conversation. “Why would she keep asking, over and over, ‘Why won’t you admit it?’” Mouzis asked. “If he had admitted it, why beg him a dozen more times?”

Mouzis also pushed back on the DA’s repeated references to Sapna as “the girl,” reminding the court that Sapna is now an adult woman and, more critically, the only direct witness in the case. She questioned why the prosecution had not called her to testify at the evidentiary hearing if they believed her account could withstand scrutiny. “She’s their sole piece of direct evidence,” Mouzis said. “Why avoid putting her on the stand?”

Responding to the prosecution’s claim that child pornography is “almost always” consumed by men, Mouzis challenged the gendered generalization, citing multiple cases and research that contradicted the assertion. “It’s a dangerous oversimplification,” she warned, “and not grounded in the evidence.”

Finally, Mouzis returned to a theme that had underscored much of the defense’s argument: cultural bias. She reiterated that much of the prosecution’s interpretation of witness statements and recorded calls lacked cultural understanding and failed to appreciate linguistic and behavioral differences. She suggested that this blind spot, combined with mischaracterizations of the evidence, could rise to the level of a violation under California’s Racial Justice Act.

As the hearing wrapped up, Judge Beronio announced that she would need 30 more days to issue a ruling in the long-running evidentiary proceeding, which began in 2019. A decision is expected at 9 a.m. on May 16 in Department 3 of the Yolo County Superior Court.

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