How Trumpism Exploits a Fractured Democracy
The rise of Donald Trump and the endurance of Trumpism are not political flukes as some have suggested (or perhaps hoped). Rather, they represent the symptoms of a system in profound disrepair.
What Martin Wolf calls the “crisis of democratic capitalism” and what Steven Levitsky and Daniel Ziblatt analyze as the “tyranny of the minority” are not separate stories. They are the two halves of the same political pathology: a democracy that has become too unequal to sustain its promises and too structurally rigged to renew itself.
Together, these two frameworks explain both the demand for authoritarian politics and the institutional pathways through which such politics can take hold.
Trumpism, far from being an external threat to the American system, has flourished within it—exploiting its weaknesses, manipulating its structures, and weaponizing its failures.
Martin Wolf’s The Crisis of Democratic Capitalism begins with a clear warning: the marriage of capitalism and democracy is coming undone. For much of the twentieth century, liberal democracies in the West delivered rising living standards, expanding opportunities, and a broadly shared sense of progress.
But that compact has broken down.
“We are no longer able to combine the operations of the market economy with stable liberal democracy,” Wolf writes. The market delivers wealth, but it no longer delivers security. Democracy still holds elections, but it no longer delivers trust.
At the heart of the crisis is what Wolf terms “pluto-populism”—a toxic fusion of elite self-interest and populist rhetoric.
Politicians like Trump promise to speak for “the people” while serving oligarchic interests.
They rail against globalization, immigration, and cultural change, while pushing policies that enrich the wealthiest Americans and deregulate the economy for corporate gain.
Trump does not represent a break with Republican economic orthodoxy but its logical conclusion: a party that advances plutocratic policy while distracting voters with nativist appeals, cultural grievances, and attacks on democratic norms.
As Wolf puts it, “How, after all, does a political party dedicated to the material interests of the top 0.1 percent of the income distribution win and hold power in a universal suffrage democracy? The answer is pluto-populism.”
The emotional engine behind this politics is status anxiety. In communities ravaged by deindustrialization and automation, the loss is not just economic—it is psychological. People feel abandoned, humiliated, and disrespected.
Many of them, as Wolf and other scholars note, once supported center-left parties that promised economic inclusion.
But those parties increasingly came to be seen as culturally liberal, technocratic, and elitist—led by professionals and academics who speak the language of equity but offer little material change. In this vacuum, the right has moved in with authoritarian zeal.
Trump’s political rise was not built on ideology but on instinct: an uncanny ability to detect the grievances, resentments, and fears that many Americans harbor but feel unable to express in polite society.
Wolf notes that Trump’s appeal was strongest among “those whose social status is low enough to generate concern but who still have a significant measure of status to defend”—a demographic both anxious and empowered.
The economic pain of the 2008 financial crisis, followed by the alienation of the COVID-19 pandemic, provided the perfect backdrop for his brand of politics: nostalgic, punitive, and authoritarian.
But Trump is not merely a consequence of economic decay. His ascent reveals a deeper rot in the American system: one of institutional vulnerability and democratic erosion.
This is where Tyranny of the Minority offers indispensable insight. Levitsky and Ziblatt argue that American democracy is uniquely exposed to minority rule. Designed in the eighteenth century to temper majority power, the Constitution now serves as a shield for a radicalized minority.
Through the Senate, the Electoral College, gerrymandered districts, and judicial capture, a shrinking segment of the population—predominantly white, rural, Christian conservatives—wields outsized influence over national policy.
The authors point out that no other modern democracy makes it so easy for a political minority to entrench itself in power.
The Republican Party, unable to win majorities in a diversifying country, has instead embraced procedural hardball and anti-democratic tactics: voter suppression, court-packing, refusal to concede elections, and outright lies about voter fraud.
The goal is not persuasion, but control.
Trump may be the face of this movement, but the deeper threat is institutional.
Tyranny of the Minority traces the long arc of democratic backsliding, showing how the tools of democracy—courts, legislatures, media—can be turned against democracy itself.
As Levitsky and Ziblatt write, “American democracy now faces an existential crisis. One of our two major parties has abandoned its commitment to democratic rules and norms. If this development continues, the survival of our republic cannot be guaranteed.”
The most chilling insight shared by both books is this: democracies rarely collapse from without. They are eroded from within, by elected leaders who manipulate laws, stoke division, and centralize power.
Trump did not need tanks in the streets. He had cable news, social media, and the loyalty of a political party willing to bend the truth until it snapped.
Trump’s constant invocation of “the people” against the elites follows a well-worn script.
As Wolf notes, this demagoguery is not new—it is the age-old pattern of democratic decline. The people, feeling voiceless and adrift, rally behind a protector who promises order, strength, and revenge.
The irony is bitter: in the name of restoring democracy, citizens empower its destroyer.
Plato saw this in ancient Athens. In The Republic, he warned that democracy, when untethered from responsibility and overwhelmed by fear, can degenerate into tyranny.
“The protector,” Plato wrote, “will be vested with power by the people, and then turn himself into a despot.”
Wolf draws a direct line from Plato’s insight to the modern phenomenon of strongman politics. Trump is not an aberration—he is a predictable byproduct of democratic decay.
But both Wolf and Levitsky/Ziblatt offer more than diagnosis—they offer direction. The future is not foreclosed.
If democratic capitalism is to survive, it must be rebalanced. That means taming capitalism, redistributing power, and rebuilding trust. Wolf calls for a reinvigoration of the social contract: more economic security, better regulation, greater inclusion. He invokes Karl Popper’s concept of “piecemeal social engineering”—a call for pragmatic, adaptive reform rather than utopian revolution. Change must be bold, but also humble; ambitious, but grounded in reality.
Levitsky and Ziblatt, meanwhile, call for institutional reforms: abolishing the filibuster, expanding voting rights, depoliticizing the courts, and abolishing the Electoral College. They argue that democracy cannot defend itself unless its rules are made more fair and more inclusive. Democracy is not self-correcting—it requires active maintenance.
Most importantly, both books remind us that democracy is not merely a system of government—it is a culture. It depends on truth, civility, restraint, and a shared belief in the legitimacy of the opposition.
When those norms erode, the system itself becomes fragile. Trumpism is a symptom of that fragility. The cure will not come from a better candidate or a better campaign. It will come from rebuilding the moral and economic foundations of democracy itself.
We are at a crossroads. One path leads toward authoritarian retrenchment, powered by resentment and institutional manipulation.
The other demands a recommitment to the hard, unglamorous work of democratic renewal. The first is easier, more emotionally satisfying, and more dangerous. The second is harder, slower—but necessary.
The challenge before us is not only to reject Trump but to understand why so many embraced him.
Until we reckon with the deep economic pain, the institutional decay, and the social fragmentation that made Trumpism possible, we will remain vulnerable—not just to him, but to whoever comes next.
As Wolf writes, “Democracy has disappeared in the past. It would be silly to assume it could not do so again.” The task now is to ensure it does not.
From article: “The authors point out that no other modern democracy makes it so easy for a political minority to entrench itself in power.”
From article: “The Republican Party, unable to win majorities in a diversifying country, has instead embraced procedural hardball and anti-democratic tactics: voter suppression, court-packing, refusal to concede elections, and outright lies about voter fraud.”
And yet, despite the convictions, January 6th, two impeachments, two assassination attempts, multiple lawsuits, etc. – Trump won the popular vote.
Perhaps no one, even recent immigrants themselves, want to see thousands crossing an uncontrolled border every day. Perhaps most of these people believe that “men” and “women” actually have a definition (that wasn’t controversial starting about 5 years ago).
But perhaps most-importantly, they believed that Trump would be better for the economy. And believed that (through tariffs, etc.) – he would put “America First”.
“once supported center-left parties that promised economic inclusion.”
Parties? What parties?
“But those parties increasingly came to be seen as culturally liberal, technocratic, and elitist—led by professionals and academics who speak the language of equity but offer little material change.”
Yeah. And whose fault is that?
“In this vacuum, the right has moved in with authoritarian zeal.”
The right didn’t created the vacuum.
“Trump’s political rise was not built on ideology but on instinct: an uncanny ability to detect the grievances, resentments, and fears that many Americans harbor but feel unable to express in polite society.”
‘Polite’ society? Are you freaking serious?
“Wolf notes that Trump’s appeal was strongest among “those whose social status is low enough to generate concern but who still have a significant measure of status to defend”—a demographic both anxious and empowered.”
Both ‘anxious and empowered’ you say; That sounds like a description that is both wise and bullsh*t.
“Through the Senate, the Electoral College, gerrymandered districts, and judicial capture, a shrinking segment of the population—predominantly white, rural, Christian conservatives—wields outsized influence over national policy.”
I thought Trump won the popular vote.
“It depends on truth, civility, restraint, and a shared belief in the legitimacy of the opposition.” None traits the noisy far-left has – maybe why Trump gained in populariity?
“The challenge before us is not only to reject Trump but to understand why so many embraced him.”
Understanding why so many embraced him is a challenge that is important, and a challenge that was utterlly failed by this article.
It’s a structural issue. Right now, according to the book, the Democratic candidate has to win the popular vote by 3 or 4 percent in order to win the electoral college. They likened it to a basketball game where shooting behind the three point line yields three points for one team and four points for the other – there are circumstances where one team is good enough to overcome it, there are circumstances where the other team would have won anyway regardless of the advantage, and there are times when the structural feature prevails. So twice since 2000, the side that got fewer votes overall won. And they walk through all of these problems. And that’s judge the electoral college. It doesn’t address the issue of the Senate or even the House through the gerrymander/ redistricting. I can’t do it justice in a 1000 word piece.
I support the electoral college and the dual legislative structure that includes the Senate. Not so hot on gerrymandering. I really don’t want the whole country to become like California. As far as “white, rural, Christian conservatives” taking over, you ignore that many more people in non-white groups voted for Trump this time around, and that young people are also tacking right. Blaming whites isn’t the left’s solution to the right, understanding the losses of votes of non-“white, rural, Christian conservatives” is what y’all need to look at. It’s not that hard if you clear away the fog.
Alan, your comment reflects a common defense of institutional structures like the Electoral College and the Senate without fully grappling with how those mechanisms distort democratic representation today.
” . . . how those mechanisms distort democratic representation today.”
Those ‘mechanisms’ ‘distorted’ ‘democratic representation’ back then, too. Why is ‘today’ special?
It’s always been problem it’s become more apparent now because of partisan polarization.
The original reason for creating the electoral college was to address southern power under slavery – they gave slaves two-thirds person status for purposes of apportionment and used the electoral college to bake in that advantage.
As Yale law professor Akhil Reed Amar has repeatedly pointed out, the Electoral College “was originally much more about slavery than about a big-state, small-state balance.”
It’s become more of a problem because the electoral advantage of small states have grown over time and the rural-urban divide has aligned with a partisan component that didn’t actually exist prior to 1964.
The US is the only country in the world where a person who loses the popular vote can still become president.
“The US is the only country in the world where a person who loses the popular vote can still become president.”
Sort of . . . but not the point so don’t care.
The value of the electoral college is debatable. I find the logic sound, but it’s not science, it’s what the founders believed was best for the country.
My overall point is that this is one of those issues that — I believe but cannot prove — you would be on the other side of if the politics fell your way.
Those who benefit from structural flaws are unlikely to attempt to change them – that’s part of the problem.
“Those who benefit from structural flaws are unlikely to attempt to change them – that’s part of the problem.”
Similar to why our City Council will never touch the issue of dissolving the district elections.
“and that young people are also tacking right”
Young men are, slightly. Young women are becoming more liberal, especially on cultural issues. The gender gap is strongest among Gen Z voters. I think the main reason is obvious.
“ Americans under the age of 30 voted for Harris by 4 points (50 percent Harris – 46 percent Trump), though young men and women diverged dramatically, with men under 30 voting for Trump by 16 points (41 percent Harris – 57 percent Trump), and women under 30 voting for Harris by 24 points (59 percent Harris – 35 percent Trump).”
https://navigatorresearch.org/2024-post-election-survey-gender-and-age-analysis-of-2024-election-results/
Earlier survey:
https://www.nytimes.com/2024/09/15/upshot/election-young-women-liberal.html
The current electoral college imbalance could be mitigated somewhat by making Puerto Rico and Washington DC states. Which is why the GOP will never let that happen.
One thing to note is that young men are not organically tacking rightward. They are being captured by the algorithm of social media and steered toward people like Andrew Tate and Joe Rogan and other of the rogue’s gallery of “manosphere” types (and in some cases outright White Nationalist ideology).
Many of this comes from incel culture, and good luck with these rightward tilting men having a relationship with a woman in their own age cohort. Those young women are rejecting those particular young men at a tremendous rate and the trend is for Gen Z women to date outside of their own age group because of it.
Acknowledging yes, I meant to say young men and what DS points out is correct. The ‘race’ aspect of rightward trend is more significant and therefore important to understand.
“The ‘race’ aspect of rightward trend is more significant and therefore important to understand.”
I don’t think it really matters which aspect of this rightward trend is “more significant,” and we can fruitlessly argue if racism is worse than misogyny.
It doesn’t really matter, though, because it all results in these men being shut out of the dating/marriage pool.
To KS, the article and my point are about learning what is causing the rightward trend in various populations, in order to counter it and learn why so many tacked right, not about politics and relationships.
Kendra says: “It doesn’t really matter, though, because it all results in these men being shut out of the dating/marriage pool.”
True – by a certain type of woman. Probably not the type these men are seeking long-term, at least.
There is another trend occurring, as well. Some men are seeking partners overseas, where the culture is different. (Racism is not likely to be a factor regarding those willing to choose a long-term partner of a different race.)
“There is another trend occurring, as well. Some men are seeking partners overseas, where the culture is different. (Racism is not likely to be a factor regarding those willing to choose a long-term partner of a different race.)”
Where is your evidence this is happening at any significant rate? I highly doubt it is. Gen Z men can barely afford to live on their own. The trend is for them to live with parents or multiple roommates.
That financial situation isn’t conducive to finding women in other countries, LOL! And imagine thinking fetishizing non-American women (usually for their supposed “subservience”) isn’t a form of racism. 😆🤣😂 Or that these non-American women won’t just be using them to get a free ticket to this country, LMAO!
On the other hand, Gen Z women are alright (only 17% report chronic loneliness, compared to over 30% of Gen Z men). Study after study demonstrates women are OK without men but not so much the reverse. I think the women you backhandedly disparage are OK with not having to deal with such (incel, due to their own actions and words) men.
There’s articles regarding “passport bros” on the Internet. Suggest you check with that, rather than asking me.
Here’s one for you, though I’m sure it’s from a source that you won’t like.
“What is a passport bro? Growing number of men are ditching American women to find love overseas”
“In many cases, these passport bros claim to seek out non-western women out of frustration or wanting something new. They often blame feminism and impossible standards by U.S. women as the reason for them seeking out relationships overseas,” dating coach Eddie Hernandez said.”
https://www.foxnews.com/media/passport-bro-growing-number-men-ditching-american-women-overseas
Here’s another source, perhaps more to your liking:
“The film follows the growing trend of African American men leaving the United States to pursue women in foreign countries, namely Brazil, according to its summary.”
“The term became mainstream in 2019 and has now expanded to include men of all races.”
https://dailyfreepress.com/01/28/19/209048/
Surely you must have at least heard of this trend?
But yes, I agree that the women you’re referring to (and the men pursuing other options) are “both” happy to not have to deal with each other.
How that works out regarding societies as a whole might be a different question (e.g., an increasingly-smaller pool of U.S. men that U.S. women are interested in, per your own observations), coupled with the impact on other societies when men pursue women in those places.
Ultimately, as people become older, they’re often less-interested in relationships at all (e.g., see “cat ladies”).
All of this might also be leading to fewer children (which I say is a “good thing” in a finite world).
But since you mention “me” in particular (regarding those whom I might agree or disagree with), it’s not an issue for me. I am not that sensitive, nor do I insist that a partner agree with me. I do not view people in such an uncompromising manner. A far more-important consideration is mutual respect, personal fondness/connection, etc.
But I will admit that I wouldn’t be interested in a romantic relationship with someone who is transgender (e.g., undergone medical procedures related to that). I suspect that most women feel that way, as well.
“Surely you must have at least heard of this trend?”
I still doubt this is happening with any statistical significance for the reasons I stated before. There aren’t enough “rich passport bros” in Gen Z to make a dent.
“All of this might also be leading to fewer children (which I say is a “good thing” in a finite world).”
Also good in a finite world: a virus with a fatality rate much more effective than Covid-19
You mention above that the women overseas might be interested in American men for a “free ticket” to this country.
And yet, you seem to ignore that one of the reasons some U.S. women aren’t interested in some U.S. men is due to the fact that a higher percentage of young men have dropped out of the workforce, living at home with their parents, etc. Might be more due to that, than political outlook.
I’m pretty sure Elon Musk has been involved with quite a few women, and would have no trouble attracting more. Same is true for Trump himself (you do recall that obscene quote attributed to him, right?)
Seems like it’s ultimately the same reason – that women often still do have expectations of men to “provide”. (Not all women, obviously.)
As far as statistics are concerned, I believe one of those articles mentioned that it’s difficult to know how many men travel overseas specifically looking for wives/girlfriends. But it does not cost a lot to travel to (and stay in) some of those countries for awhile.
And that would be true for those traveling from other countries (such as Europe), as well. (There’s parts of Thailand which seem popular with German tourists/men.)
But I suspect you’re correct overall, that it’s not a huge trend for young men in the U.S.
Men are obviously the primary customers of prostitution, as well. Everywhere. Not to mention pornography, etc. (Perhaps those services provide some degree of “substitution” to a relationship, for some men.) But like I said, people in general (including men) tend to lose interest in romantic/sexual relationships as they age, regardless. Issues such as prostate cancer tend to gain increasing importance, as one ages.
“A self-confessed serial dater and bestselling author feels liberal women could prefer to find love with a conservative man in order to feel safe and respected.”
““It’s not that women like, quote unquote ‘conservative men,’ they just don’t like liberals, and they don’t like men that are not real men,” Santagati told Fox News Digital.
“Any liberal woman who’s with a liberal man, chances are she hates him, she resents him,” Santagati continued. “Women want to be with a man that they can trust that they feel safe with. And the bottom line is conservative men have these qualities over liberals by a landslide.”
https://nypost.com/2024/09/14/lifestyle/dating-guru-explains-why-liberal-men-can-never-satisfy-liberal-women/
““Any liberal woman who’s with a liberal man, chances are she hates him, she resents him,” Santagati continued. “Women want to be with a man that they can trust that they feel safe with. And the bottom line is conservative men have these qualities over liberals by a landslide.””
Another straw man made up in the fevered imaginations of some “conservative” somewhere. So many failures of critical reasoning in that one sentence, it’s embarrassing it was published.
And the evidence just doesn’t bear this out. Women are rejecting “conservative” men. Their definition of what is “manly” is pretty simplistic and IMO morally bankrupt.