California has ramped up its efforts to combat retail theft, but two recent reports raise urgent questions about whether those efforts are effective—or even trackable. A decade after voters passed Proposition 47, reducing certain theft crimes to misdemeanors, a complex legal and social landscape has emerged around retail crime. While public concern has driven lawmakers to increase penalties and enforcement, the state still lacks the comprehensive data needed to determine if these changes are working.
A report from the state’s Legislative Analyst’s Office (LAO), Retail Theft in California: Looking Back at a Decade of Change, finds that while reported retail theft rose 11 percent between 2014 and 2023, current levels remain far below the highs of the 1980s. The report attributes part of the post-2021 rise to the end of COVID-related shutdowns, but also notes that changes in criminal law and policing practices may have played a role.
“The number of people incarcerated dropped significantly during the pandemic,” the report explains, “and clearance rates—the percentage of cases where police make an arrest—declined from 14 percent in 2014 to just 8 percent in 2023.” These declines, according to researchers, likely contributed to higher theft rates by decreasing the perceived risk of apprehension.
Proposition 47, approved in 2014, changed many low-level property crimes—including retail theft under $950—from felonies to misdemeanors. That shift limited law enforcement’s ability to arrest and detain individuals and may have reduced the deterrent effect of the criminal justice system.
“Officers can arrest for misdemeanors only under limited circumstances,” the LAO notes, which can lead to fewer arrests and prosecutions. Additionally, people arrested for misdemeanors are more likely to be released quickly without detention, further reducing consequences.
But the LAO stops short of placing full blame on Proposition 47. It also highlights social and technological changes, including the growth of online marketplaces that facilitate the resale of stolen goods and the expansion of self-checkout lines. Pandemic-era masking policies may also have made it easier to avoid detection.
To address the surge in concern, lawmakers and voters have recently passed a wave of new laws, including Proposition 36 and Assembly Bill 2943, which reintroduce felony charges for certain repeat theft offenses, allow aggregation of multiple thefts to reach felony thresholds, and extend probation lengths for shoplifting offenses. State funding has also expanded, with $85 million allocated to local law enforcement and $10 million to prosecutors for organized retail theft efforts.
However, the LAO cautions that more punishment doesn’t automatically translate to less crime.
“Implementation decisions made by local prosecutors, judges, and law enforcement will determine whether these new tools actually reduce retail theft,” the report states. It calls on the Legislature to engage in rigorous oversight, asking critical questions: Are the new laws being used? Are they applied equitably? Are they working?
These concerns echo a parallel report from the Little Hoover Commission titled Retail Theft: A Data-Driven Response for California. That report warns that the state lacks essential infrastructure to track and analyze retail theft.
“At the time of the Commission’s study, the state did not collect or track data on organized retail theft,” the report explains. It calls for the California Department of Justice to expand data collection to include demographics, crime circumstances, prosecutorial decisions, and recidivism. Without that, the Commission argues, California is flying blind.
The Commission also urges the state to partner with nonpartisan academic institutions to study core questions: What preventive measures actually work? How much theft goes unreported? What is the real economic cost of retail theft? What shapes public perception?
Without that information, both reports caution, it’s impossible to know whether policy changes are solving the problem—or simply changing its form.
The LAO report concludes with a warning about unintended consequences. “For example,” it states, “increased punishment for adults could cause organized theft rings to recruit juveniles under the assumption they face less serious penalties.” It also raises concerns about disproportionate impacts on unhoused people, individuals with substance use disorders, or marginalized racial groups.
Ultimately, the question of whether California is “winning” the fight against retail theft remains unanswered. Both the LAO and Little Hoover Commission argue that the next step must be data—not politics. Until policymakers can measure what’s happening and why, the state’s retail theft laws may amount to little more than guesswork.
As the LAO bluntly puts it, “Monitoring rates of reported shoplifting and commercial burglary can provide a helpful indication of whether crime is declining—but only if those numbers are interpreted with caution.” Without better data, the true scale—and solution—to California’s retail theft problem will remain out of reach.
