Analysis: False Confessions Do Happen

interrogatorIt is a trial that, in strange ways, still haunts me.  Bennie Moses sentenced to 830 years for the crime of the repeated rape of his daughter over a period of years.

There were enough reasons to believe he did it – there was DNA evidence of his daughter and his own semen found inside the fly of his shorts, there was her testimony, and then there was his own confession.

What haunts me is that the strength of each of these pillars of evidence, by themselves, were profoundly weak.  None weaker than the confession, achieved after hours and hours of interrogations.

At one point, the public defender wrote in a motion: “After the verdicts were read and recorded, defense counsel and one other member from defense counsel’s office spoke with approximately 6 members of the jury.  These 6 members of the jury indicated that Mr. Moses’ ‘confession’ was the crux of the evidence in determining Mr. Moses’ guilt and that absent the confession the other evidence would have been scrutinized more than it was.”

One of the jurors mentioned that “she had asked her husband whether he could ever be coerced to admitting that he slept with their daughter if he did not do so.  This juror further indicated that her husband told her there is no way he would ever admit to sleeping with his daughter if he did not do so, no matter what.”

Ultimately, Judge Mock would rule that the juror’s transgression [in discussing the case with her husband] was minor and the strength of other evidence trumped it.

But what troubles me is that we know that people confess to crimes they did not commit all the time.  If that juror was bothered by that evidence, perhaps it was more critical than the judge acknowledged.

In the New York Times this weekend, they recount the story of a frightened 16-year-old who was arrested in the shooting death of Antonio Ramirez in Oakland.

As told by David Shipler, the police picked up the suspect and interrogated him late at night, with no lawyer and rejecting his pleas to see his mother, and they “harangued him until he began to tell them what he thought they wanted to hear.”

The only thing that saved this kid, in this case, is that the police were so incompetent that the confession that they coerced was impossible to believe.

Writes Mr. Shipler, author of a forthcoming book, Rights at Risk: The Limits of Liberty in Modern America, from which this account was derived:

They wanted a diagram of the crime scene, he later told his court-appointed lawyer, Richard Foxall, but whatever he drew was so inaccurate that the police never produced it. When he described escaping in one direction after the killing, they corrected him, because they knew from witnesses that the shooter had gone the opposite way. When he didn’t mention an alley nearby, they told him about it, and he incorporated it into his statement. “Now we’re getting somewhere,” said one officer, as Felix recalled to his lawyer.

So, they demanded, where was the gun? Felix denied having a gun. “That’s when they really got out of control and started yelling at him,” Mr. Foxall said. “He started to feel personally threatened.” Slyly, he made up something demonstrably untrue: that he had left the gun with his grandfather. “I thought this was brilliant,” his lawyer said, because it discredited the tale. “He doesn’t have a grandfather. Both grandfathers are dead.”

Once the police had badgered a rough murder confession from Felix, they taped it. Yet the confession lacked a critical detail – one that officers neglected to feed to him. Felix learned it three days later in court when he was handed the charge sheet and saw the date of the crime. He stared at the document and realized that he had the perfect alibi: On the day that Antonio Ramirez was gunned down, Felix had been locked up in a juvenile detention facility for violating probation in a case of theft.

As Mr. Shipler reports, the murder charge was dropped.  Felix was very fortunate that he had such an airtight alibi.  As Mr. Foxall reportedly said, “I would have hated to have had to try the case.”

You might think, why?  The case was so flimsy even without the alibi.  Mr. Foxall said: “It would have been very scary. Juries don’t want to believe that somebody will confess to a crime he didn’t commit.”

The problem is that no one wants to believe that someone would falsely confess.

To illustrate that point, the juvenile commissioner in Felix’s case said, “Well, I don’t understand – why would he confess?”

This is the problem that the juror, asking her husband that question, brings up because if you cannot relate to the situations that Mr. Moses or Felix were in, you cannot see it through their eyes.

Writes Mr. Shipler: “If you have never been tortured, or locked up and verbally threatened, you may find it hard to believe that anyone would confess to something he had not done. Intuition holds that the innocent do not make false confessions. What on earth could be the motive? To stop the abuse? To curry favor with the interrogator? To follow some fragile thread of imaginary hope that cooperation will bring freedom?”

He continues: “Psychological studies of confessions that have proved false show an overrepresentation of children, the mentally ill and mentally retarded, and suspects who are drunk or high. They are susceptible to suggestion, eager to please authority figures, disconnected from reality or unable to defer gratification.”

But he also notes: “Mature adults of normal intelligence have also confessed falsely after being manipulated.”

Mr. Shipler tries to show how this occurs.  He writes:

Officers are taught to use all the tricks and lies that courts permit within the scope of the Fifth Amendment’s shield against self-incrimination. John E. Reid & Associates, which has trained thousands of interrogators, suggests that a suspect be induced to waive his constitutional rights to silence and counsel by giving him the famous Miranda warning “casually” and not immediately after arrest, when he is “defensive and guarded” and “more likely to invoke his rights.” When a skilled questioner splices it nonchalantly into conversation, the warning’s empowering message of choice can be lost on a suspect. Many false confessors have been routinely Mirandized in this perfunctory manner.

He delves into interrogation techniques: “To get people talking, the Reid training also recommends questions that imply leniency without making explicit promises, and that reduce moral responsibility by blaming peer pressure: ‘Was this your idea or did your buddies talk you into it?’ “

He continues: “Interrogators are advised to pretend to have evidence but not to fabricate it. A suspect can be shown a card bearing a latent fingerprint and be told: ‘This is your fingerprint. We found it inside that stolen car.’ That’s been allowed by courts if the police officer puts his or her own print on the card but not if the officer fakes it with the suspect’s print. Admissions produced by these tactics may be true or untrue.”

He cites what I consider one of the scariest figures, that in 289 convictions that were reversed by DNA evidence, false confessions figured in 24 percent.

People will have a tendency to take solace in the figure 289, and some will even divide that by four to produce the number of false confessions, but that is a false sense of relief.

As Mr. Shipler quickly points out, “Considering that DNA is available in just a fraction of all crimes, a much larger universe of erroneous convictions – and false confessions – surely exists.”

That is the real problem, we just do not know.  Skeptics will argue that in Mr. Moses’ case there was DNA evidence – but it was a very small amount, and without the confession it would not be difficult to perhaps question the sufficiency of that evidence.  Other jurors wondered afterward whether the victim, whose accounts were thin and sketchy, may have made the whole thing up.

Prosecutors would argue, in fact did argue, that despite the seeming weaknesses in all of the pieces of evidence, the chance of all the evidence falsely pointing toward guilt seems remote.  But then again, who knows?  What we do know is that people falsely confess, but most of the time it is just not as blatant as it was for Felix.

—David M. Greenwald reporting

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  • David Greenwald

    Greenwald is the founder, editor, and executive director of the Davis Vanguard. He founded the Vanguard in 2006. David Greenwald moved to Davis in 1996 to attend Graduate School at UC Davis in Political Science. He lives in South Davis with his wife Cecilia Escamilla Greenwald and three children.

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16 comments

  1. It’s not a non-issue at all. Did you actually read some of the blurb and the research on this matter? The manual which trains officers on how to get people to waive their rights?

  2. [quote]That is the real problem, we just do not know. Skeptics will argue that in Mr. Moses’ case there was DNA evidence – but it was a very small amount, and without the confession it would not be difficult to perhaps question the sufficiency of that evidence. [/quote]

    How so? What does the small amount of DNA evidence have to do with anything? Small amounts of DNA evidence are not a bar to its introduction as viable evidence – it does not take much to produce DNA evidence…

    Again, a lot of speculation here, based on talks with the defense side… Do you believe this defendant was innocent? If so, why? Why did the jury get it wrong?

  3. The reason the small amount matters is that there is a possibility of transfer – something that the expert on DNA couldn’t rule out.

    There is a lot of speculation on the Moses case. When watched the trial, I believed there were some holes in the evidence but the combination of evidence pushed me towards believing guilt over innocence. But I’m not sure and I have grown more unsure over time. I have probably more access to the thinking of this jury than any other because I met with one of the jurors afterwards, I know her from other things, and she has shared with me a bunch of insights that leads me to believe that the jurors themselves believe he did it but even they have nagging doubts about it.

    The confession was a problem – they had him in there much too long, they told him he could go and then he couldn’t, is it possible that he broke down at the end and told them what he thought they wanted to hear? I think so. Does that by itself mean he didn’t do it? Not at all.

  4. “Analysis: False Confessions Do Happen”

    Yes, that’s true. It’s been documented.

    That has nothing to do with Mr. Moses’ case. The differences in these two cases–in the totality of the evidence, in the lengths of the criminal behaviors, in the credibility of the alibis, in the testing by trial, etc,–make such a comparison ridiculous.

    It’s a shame that you’re “haunted” by the Moses case, a case of the most disgusting series of crimes perpetrated on the man’s own daughter. Consider how haunted the victim and her family have been, are and will be by his horrible acts for years to come. If you’ve forgotten how horrendous his crimes are, please reread your reports during the trial. it might be helpful for you to peruse the comments of others who reacted to your odd evaluation of whether Mr. Moses’ guilt was proved.

    I hope you find closure for your haunting issues. Your emotion is wasted on this man. No new examples of coerced confessions will change the fact that Mr. Moses was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt in a fair trial.

  5. [quote]I have probably more access to the thinking of this jury than any other because I met with one of the jurors afterwards, I know her from other things, and she has shared with me a bunch of insights that leads me to believe that the jurors themselves believe he did it but even they have nagging doubts about it. [/quote]

    You know this from speaking to one juror out of twelve? Perhaps the other eleven do not view things the same way this juror did.

    Secondly, the standard of guilt is “beyond a REASONABLE DOUBT”; it is not beyond ANY DOUBT. There is a difference…

  6. “You know this from speaking to one juror out of twelve? Perhaps the other eleven do not view things the same way this juror did.”

    I don’t know where all eleven view things, but I do have insights into four or five of the jurors for a variety of reasons.

    “Secondly, the standard of guilt is “beyond a REASONABLE DOUBT”; it is not beyond ANY DOUBT. There is a difference… “

    That is true. Although it makes things even more fuzzy rather than less in a case like this one.

  7. [quote]I don’t know where all eleven view things, but I do have insights into four or five of the jurors for a variety of reasons. [/quote]

    Did you speak to those 4 or 5 jurors?

    [quote]That is true. Although it makes things even more fuzzy rather than less in a case like this one.[/quote]

    How so? Many (probably most) cases are not clear cut/”fuzzy”. The jurors weighed on this one and determined the man was guilty “beyond a REASONABLE doubt”. Even you don’t seem to have anything substantive to hang your hat on, other than a queasy feeling in the pit of your stomach, that would indicate this defendant is innocent of the charges. Any juror is going to feel “queasy” in determining the innocence or guilt of another human being – it is not an easy thing to sit in judgment of someone else. But would it be better to let this guy go free to molest again, just because you personally have some vague unspecified “doubts”? There will always be a scintilla of doubt bc there is no perfect justice system nor test for guilt – that is just reality – the world is not perfect, even if it should be…

  8. Elaine: Because to me, even jurors that thought he did it seemed to have very serious doubts about a whole range of things. I’m not sure where reasonable doubt begins and any doubt ends.

    “But would it be better to let this guy go free to molest again, just because you personally have some vague unspecified “doubts”? “

    Isn’t the whole premise of our legal system and the basis for presumption of innocence precisely that?

  9. [quote]Isn’t the whole premise of our legal system and the basis for presumption of innocence precisely that?[/quote]

    NO, NO, NO! Our system of justice is based on proof beyond REASONABLE DOUBT – IT IS NOT PROOF BEYOND ANY DOUBT!!! It sounds as if you are advocating for a new standard of justice where the proof has to be beyond any doubt whatever. Is that what you are advocating for?

  10. [quote]Elaine: “But would it be better to let this guy go free to molest again, just because you personally have some vague unspecified “doubts”? ”

    “Isn’t the whole premise of our legal system and the basis for presumption of innocence precisely that?”[/quote]No, of course it is not.

    The presumption of innocence applies [u]before[/u] a defendant is found guilty. The jury found him guilty beyond reasonable doubt. Your observations about the trial and about how the juror feels about his own decision about Mr. Moses’ guilt obviously mistaken.

    Whether “even jurors that thought he did it seemed to have very serious doubts about a whole range of things” isn’t a meaningful investigation. They decided he did it; they decided he’s guilty. And, you were not and never will be a juror on this case no matter how much you pursue it.

    You need to look at your own feelings and emotions about this case rather than continue on this weird mission to prove Mr. Moses not guilty or sorta’ guilty or maybe guilty or guilty but not quite really. It’s starting to get a little creepy.

  11. Elaine: I’m not trying to create a new standard, I’m just arguing that the line for PBRD is not nearly as clean as we would like it to be. The definition given in court instructions is an abiding conviction – which prosecutors often use as the Thanksgiving test that you will still believe in your decision when you sit around Thanksgiving talking to your family. The problem here is that the jurors, at least a handful that I have had direct or indirect contact seem to have lingering doubts.

  12. This is an email I got from one of the jurors last year:

    “Had lunch on wednesday w/an alternate juror who actually is an old friend of mine. She still wonders if [the victim] made up some or all of it. I don’t think that’s an outrageous possibility.”

    This is the type of email message that leads me to wonder about things. What if the confession were thrown out based on improper techniques, do you think that perhaps more of the jurors would be questioning this decision?

    I understand what you and Elaine are saying, but there is something about this verdict that bothers me. Maybe I’m just biased, but on the day the verdict was read, I was pretty much okay with it and it has been increasingly nagging on me ever since.

  13. Have you ever served on a jury for a violent crime? Based on my own experiences, I don’t think it that unusual for jurors to be concerned that they got it right. Jurors take their job seriously. They’re often involved in very emotional trials. They can feel uneasy about being “responsible” for the results of their guilty findings–prison time, family break-ups, etc.

    In one of my own cases, we felt terrible about how the youthful defendent didn’t have much of a chance to make it in life, given the unfortunate upbringing he suffered through. It gave us a little reassurance about our original jury decision when he ended up in prision five years later for committing an even more horrendous crime.

    It might not be an “outrageous possibility” that a juror writes you about an alternate who still wonders if the victim “made up” some of her account or enhanced it or didn’t remember it all correctly. Of course, she missed the jury’s deliberation. And, this doesn’t even meet the Thanksgiving Standard–the regular juror’s communicating with someone who is on record questioning pretty much everything that law enforcement and the DA’s office did in this case (and as a general view).

    No collection of evidence ever is perfect for a jury. It’s almost always unsatisfactory to second-guess a jury’s decision even if one has observed the trial; the jury’s deliberations often are critical elementa to getting to the guilt decision. No one argues that the doubt standard is a clean line that will be the same for everyone, but it’s a high standard for everyone who finds themselves on a jury.

    In this case, you questioned the same things at the time. But consider. If there was no DNA…if there were no witnesses…if there was no other forensic evidence…if Mr. Moses hadn’t confessed to authorities….if he hadn’t tried to blame the victim…. But, all of this evidence was provided during the trial.

  14. At some point, the “trial” has to end, regardless of any vague doubts that may be raised after the fact. That is just the reality. Life is not perfect, no will it ever be. Self-doubt is common among jurors I am sure, and is as it should be. It means the jurors took their job seriously and not lightly, and not without reservations. But in the end, they came to a verdict as a team/group, of guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Unless some new evidence surfaces, the case is OVER…

  15. This is the problem with this type of discussion. The point of the article was to use evidence from other studies to re-evaluate a troublesome portion of a trial that we covered. The thing is not one of the comments addressed either the confession itself or the substance of this story. Yeah a jury found him guilty, but a jury found a lot of people guilty who confessed to crimes they did not commit.

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