By Dominique Kato
SAN FRANCISCO – A California Appellate Court has granted Wakeen Best, who was previously found guilty of animal abuse, burglary, and vandalism, a new trial on grounds that the trial court erred in denying her Faretta motion to represent herself at trial.
According to trial court records, on February 10, 2018, Wakeen Best entered the Sutter/Stockton garage, and broke into a car which happened to have a chihuahua inside. As the dog began barking, calling attention to Best, she then killed the dog by dropping him from the 7th floor of the parking structure.
The defendant was convicted of three felonies: second degree burglary of a vehicle, killing, maiming, or abusing an animal and vandalism of the vehicle. She was also charged with four misdemeanors.
Best claims that the trial court erred in denying her Faretta motion to represent herself in court. The Appellate Court agreed and reversed the judgment, granting Best a new trial.
On March 14, 2018, the trial court expressed doubt about the defendant’s competency to stand trial, although it was found that the defendant refused to face the judge in order to avoid having her image recorded. The actions of Best had sparked outrage in the media. The court appointed experts to evaluate Best and on April 18, 2018, they found her mentally competent to stand trial.
On June 4, 2018, during the Faretta hearing, the court confirmed the defendant had read and initialed each portion of the “Advisement and Waiver of Right to Counsel” form and questioned Best on her knowledge of the charges she faced.
The court asked the defendant whether she understood that she would be held to the same standard as an attorney, that the case would be prosecuted by an experienced district attorney, she would have to conduct the trial on her own, and that she would face disadvantages such as limited access to legal research. Best indicated she understood all of these things.
However, throughout the hearing the defendant’s responses showed lack of understanding of legal concepts and procedures. The defendant acknowledged that she did not know the difference between general and
specific intent crimes, but said she would do so by the time of trial, a trial two days away.
Other questions indicated if the defendant had examined the Penal Code and Evidence Code, and in response, she said she had been reading “the Evidence Code of the Penal Code,” showing that her understanding of the statutory provisions was limited.
The trial court denied her Faretta motion and the defense attorney represented her in trial, where she was convicted of three felonies. Best is now appealing that judgment, arguing the court made an error in denying her motion.
In a press release on July 20, 2018, SF DA George Gascón stated, “This defendant showed no remorse and is responsible for the death of a little, defenseless animal. This verdict also sends a clear message that in San Francisco there are consequences for harming our beloved pets.”
“We are grateful to the jury for the verdict in this case and for the hard work of the District Attorney’s Office and the SFPD,” said Virginia Donohue, Executive Director of Animal Care & Control. “We hope that this gives Dunky’s family some comfort.”
In the court opinion, the First California District Court of Appeals cited People v. Phillips: “When a defendant makes an unequivocal request for self-representation, the trial court must determine whether the defendant is competent to waive the right to counsel, that is, whether the defendant is able to understand the nature and object of the proceedings and the risks and dangers of self-representation.”
And, that is what the trial court did during the Faretta hearing, and found Best competent to withstand trial.
In citing People v. Bradford, “[A] criminal defendant’s ability to represent himself has no bearing upon his competence to choose self-representation.” The Appellate court says, “The trial court here did not find, and the Attorney General does not contend, that the defendant suffered from severe mental illness rendering her incapable of carrying out the basic tasks of presenting a defense—that is, that she was mentally competent to represent herself.”
The Attorney General argues that Best’s statements show that the defendant did not fully understand the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation, and that this was the reason the trial court denied the defendant’s Faretta motion. The Appellate Court argues that technical legal knowledge is irrelevant to whether he or she is competent to waive the right to counsel.
In People v. Silfa (2001), the trial court asked the defendant if he understood the elements of the crimes he was charged with, and the defendant indicated he did not understand what the court was asking, nor the difference between general or specific intent crimes.
The judge held, “Although I’m satisfied that you’re mentally competent and that you are fully informed of the right to counsel, I find that you do not understand what I’ve told you and what the consequences are of your contemplated act, and I specifically find that Mr. Silfa has not intelligently and voluntarily waived his right to be represented by counsel.”
The Appellate Court concluded this ruling was an error arguing that since the court found that the defendant was mentally competent and fully informed of his right to counsel. The court claimed, “He had demonstrated that he was literate and understood the dangers of self-representation. Nothing more was required of him in order to exercise his right of self-representation.”
The Appellate Court stated, “The same is true in this case.” The defendant had been found competent to stand trial, and there was indication she suffered from severe mental illness to the point she was not competent to conduct trial proceedings on her own. The court claims “her ignorance of legal procedure and language is not a basis to deny her the right to self-representation.”
The court further rejects the Attorney General’s argument that they should uphold the ruling because the defendants’ request was untimely. The Appellate court says, the trial court did not find the motion untimely nor find it would cause delay, and there is no basis to conclude it was brought on for the purposes of causing a delay.
“Because the record contains nothing indicating self-representation would have delayed the trial, we cannot uphold the ruling on the alternate grounds that it was untimely” argues the Appellate Court.
Finally, the court concluded that the transcript of the Faretta hearing did not show the defendant was advised on the maximum punishment she faced for the offenses with which she was charged. The court expresses, “We trust that if the defendant again seeks to represent herself, she will be fully informed of the consequences of her decision, in particular the state prison time she faces.”
Applying the rule that a wrongful denial of a timely Faretta motion is reversible, the court reversed the judgment and remanded the matter for a new trial.
To sign up for our new newsletter – Everyday Injustice – https://tinyurl.com/yyultcf9
