In Tabler v. Lumpkin, the ACLU represents a Texas death row prisoner whose lawyers refused to represent him at a hearing to determine his capacity to decide whether to give up his state post-conviction appeals, leaving him effectively unrepresented at that hearing. Our petition asks the Supreme Court to review Richard Tabler’s case and to hold that when a defendant’s lawyers abandon him, his waiver of further appeals should not bar his access to federal habeas corpus review of the constitutionality of his conviction.
Summary
The federal writ of habeas corpus provides a remedy for state prisoners who can show that they are in custody in violation of their federal rights, including the right to effective assistance of counsel at trial. Federal courts, however, out of respect for state courts’ procedures, will not grant relief if the state courts denied the claim because a petitioner did not comply with a state procedural rule.
Texas death row prisoner Richard Tabler asked a federal court for a new penalty trial because he received ineffective assistance from his trial lawyers. The federal court, however, refused to hear his claim because he had dropped his litigation of the same claim in state court. But Mr. Tabler, who suffers from severe mental impairments, dropped his state appeals in a hearing at which his appointed lawyers refused to participate, leaving him without legal representation.
Our petition asks the Supreme Court to decide whether Mr. Tabler’s abandonment by his attorneys at a key hearing should “excuse” his non-compliance with a state procedural rule, and thus allow the federal court to review his federal claim: that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance under the Sixth Amendment to the Constitution.
Question Presented
At a hearing to determine whether Richard Tabler could waive his right to state habeas review, his attorneys explicitly refused to participate, declaring that they “d[id] not announce ready[] because we do not intend to take a position one way or the other.” Counsel left Mr. Tabler to proceed on his own. They did not object to the court’s erroneous instructions indicating that his habeas proceedings began only after his direct appeal concluded, meaning he could change his mind at any time before the direct appeal decision. And they never told the court about an expert report detailing their client’s severe mental impairments. The court proceeded without asking Mr. Tabler whether he wanted alternative counsel or intended to waive his state right to counsel. Instead, it elicited Mr. Tabler’s assertion, “I’m competent enough,” and determined he was competent to proceed. Mr. Tabler later attempted to revive his habeas proceedings within the time the state court had indicated he could do so, but by then he had missed the actual deadline for filing, a date no one had informed him about. As a result, federal courts on habeas review held that he had procedurally defaulted his Sixth Amendment claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel.
This Court held in Maples v. Thomas, 565 U.S. 266 (2012), that counsel’s abandonment of a client in state court proceedings severs the agency relationship between counsel and client and excuses procedural default in federal habeas proceedings. And in Martinez v. Ryan, 566 U.S. 1 (2012), it held that cause to excuse procedural default also arises where counsel is either ineffective or absent in state post-conviction proceedings that provide the initial opportunity to review ineffectiveness of trial counsel claims. The court below refused to apply either decision to excuse default here.
The question presented is: Where counsel’s renunciation of representation leads to a procedural default in state post-conviction proceedings that provide the initial opportunity to challenge ineffectiveness of trial counsel, does that renunciation constitute cause to excuse the default in federal habeas proceedings?
Full legal brief: link
