WASHINGTON, D.C. — A case before the U.S. Supreme Court is raising serious questions about whether plea agreements can force Americans to surrender fundamental constitutional rights, spotlighting the power of the criminal legal system to pressure individuals into waiving their liberties.
The court on Tuesday, March 4, heard arguments in a case involving when American citizens can be compelled to give up their rights through a plea “agreement.”
The petitioner, Munson P. Hunter, III, pleaded guilty in February 2024 to committing wire fraud against a financial institution, along with aiding and abetting.
A federal district court in Texas sentenced Hunter to 51 months in prison and three years of supervised release, noting that Hunter must take psychiatric medications prescribed by his physician.
The petitioner then challenged his sentence at the U.S. Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, arguing that the forced intake of medication infringed on his due process liberty interest and that the written “aiding and abetting” sentence was wrongfully attributed. The Fifth Circuit dismissed the appeal because the charge was part of the count to which Hunter pleaded guilty.
“You have a right to appeal. If you wish to appeal, [your counsel] will continue to represent you,” the U.S. Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals stated.
Following that exchange, the Texas district court permitted comments on the sentence, and the prosecutor protested: “Your Honor, I believe—well, no. I—no.”
Hunter did not have the foresight to acknowledge the waiving of his rights pursuant to the written plea agreement to appeal his sentence. He was under the false impression that he had the right to appeal the conditions of his sentence but was wrongfully misinformed.
Afterward, when Hunter sought review from the Fifth Circuit, the court dismissed his appeal, stating that the district court’s assurance was “legally meaningless.”
Under a Cato Institute amicus brief, written by Justice Jackson, Hunter reached out to the Supreme Court for support, which questions two primary notions.
First, the brief inquired “whether the only permissible exceptions to a general appeal waiver are for claims of ineffective assistance of counsel or that the sentence exceeds the statutory minimum.”
Second, it asked, “whether an appeal waiver applies when the sentencing judge advises the defendant that he has the right to appeal and the government does not object.”
Supreme Court Justice Ketanji Brown Jackson argues that under “The Hand of Oppression,” “Individual rights should be protected from the forces of a tyrannical majority […] There is no greater threat to society than the institutionalization of the government’s power to manipulate the wills and circumstances of individuals.”
Justice Jackson questioned whether Hunter was provided an offer in exchange for his constitutional rights or if he was threatened to surrender them.
Scholars have questioned the linking of coercion with threats, suggesting that conditional offers are, in essence, coercive; however, due to the nature of proposals, the distinction between them lies in their relationship to the baseline, which represents the coerced individual’s situation before the proposal. “Threats worsen the coerced’s situation, while offers do not,” theorists claimed.
Justice Jackson’s thesis argued that there exists no clear line between an offer and a threat, claiming that it is difficult to pinpoint where a defendant’s “baseline” is—in reality, it is entirely subjective.
The thesis includes a fruitful example by philosopher Robert Nozick: “If person A threatens person B—proposes to worsen B’s situation—unless B does action X, and as a result, B does X, then, according to this theory, A has coerced B.”
Plea agreements exploit the gap in ambiguity: A charge that carries a sentence of mandatory life imprisonment puts the accused in a vulnerable position; if they refuse, coercive pressure turns the proposal into a threat.
Judges in plea agreements signal to individuals who plead guilty the possibility of a lenient sentence, deny the chance of bail and engage in direct intimidation.
Moreover, they manipulate their power through administrative scheduling; defense counsel are left without time to prepare for trial, promoting Justice Jackson’s thesis on judges’ overarching sway and contradicting plea agreements in American jurisdictions—this is illegal and often happens without consequence.
By contrast, defense attorneys provide the framework of biased plea variations, withholding critical information from those accused.
Justice Jackson concurs that court actors choose “Assembly Line Justice” between pursuing their interests in “efficiency, conformity, and networking” and seeking justice.
Further, she urges citizens to commit to “ridding the system of unnecessary and unacceptable forms of coercion, at almost all costs.”
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