![](https://davisvanguard.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/YoloCourt-16-765x510.jpg)
By Cynthia Hoang-Duong
WOODLAND, CA – Here in Yolo County Superior Court last week, Judge Daniel M. Wolk refused to grant a defense motion to dismiss a case despite Deputy District Attorney Jesse Richardson’s apparent failure to comply with a Penal Code section 1381 demand that requires him to bring the accused to trial within 90 days.
Deputy Public Defender Richard Van Zandt appeared at a warrant hearing on behalf of his client, who is charged with burglary in the second degree and possession of burglary tools for an alleged incident involving stolen money from a mosque’s donation box.
The judge began the proceedings by declaring his intent to recall the warrant, but DDA Richardson disagreed, explaining that because the warrant is outstanding, it is not necessary for the court to recall it, and if the accused is released from custody before the 1381 demand procedures, the warrant will ensure his presence.
Recalling that he had previously issued an order to produce in March for the accused, Judge Wolk inquired of the attorneys about his status. They informed him that the accused had been unavailable because he was transported to Ventura County to address another case there, rendering the order ineffective.
Because of the warrant issue, the judge questioned whether the court was required to issue another order to produce and if the defense intended to file another 1381 demand.
Adamantly opposed to this, DPD Van Zandt argued that another 1381 demand was not necessary because the faults lay with the prosecution.
“If he’s not at a place where he was, if he’s been moved, then it’s up to the government to get him. He’s still in custody, kept by the government. It’s up to the government to find him and get him. We know where he is. This could have been done a month ago,” maintained the DPD.
Further, he emphasized the case had been continued for two weeks, allowing the prosecution to gauge whether the two parties could bypass the 1381 procedures altogether and dismiss the case. The DDA was expected to communicate with the victims at the mosque but he had failed to do so, said the DPD.
Ultimately, DPD Van Zandt requested the court dismiss the case in the interest of justice.
Arguing the amount of money allegedly stolen was “very low,” the DPD stated the government resources used to deliver the accused to court “far outweigh the amount of money taken from the mosque.” Moreover, the accused has been in state prison in multiple counties, past the 90-day period.
In response, DDA Richardson explained that he did not have time to contact the people of the mosque. Requesting the judge set a briefing schedule for dismissal, he reassured the court that he would continue his efforts to settle the case—without the 1381 process because the accused is serving time in other places.
“The victims do have Marsy’s law right to be heard … I know that, while Mr. Van Zandt thinks it’s not very serious, it was very serious to them,” remarked the DDA.
DPD Van Zandt disagreed, reiterating, “Your Honor, we’ve filed a valid 1381 demand. Mr. Richardson’s office received it. [The accused] has not been brought to trial within 90 days. This is a black-and-white issue. I’m asking for Your Honor to dismiss it.”
He added, if the DDA wished to refile the charges, his office had the ability.
Again, opposing this, DDA Richardson recounted the accused had been unavailable for pick up—as required by the order to produce—and thus, the demand no longer applied because the prosecution was unable to retrieve him.
Again, the DPD pinned the blame on the prosecution, arguing, “[The accused] may not have been at the place where he initially filed the 1381 demand due to no fault of his own. The government is moving him around. The government needs to bring him here. It’s not [the accused]’s fault that he wasn’t brought here. It is entirely the government’s fault.”
Judge Wolk asked the DDA how much time the prosecution needed to file a brief in response to the oral motion made by the defense. Richardson stated he preferred four weeks, leading the judge to set a hearing on Aug. 3 for the court to make a decision.
He also decided not to recall the warrant despite the DPD’s Penal Code section 977 appearance for the accused.
When asked if the DPD approved, Van Zandt clarified whether the prosecution would be able to refile the charges. As he argued, if there is a dismissal in four weeks and the DDA could refile, the prosecution would have additional time because of the delay.
“If the case [had been] dismissed at 90 days, then a new clock would have run, a new 90-day clock,” Van Zandt argued, “They shouldn’t get an additional 90 days if in fact they refile.”
Therefore, if the judge immediately dismissed the case, the prosecution would be pressured to handle the case. In other words, a new clock would start.
Based on this argument, the DPD requested the parties return earlier—in two weeks—because the DDA had not used the previous two weeks effectively to contact the mosque people. The DDA would be required to file his brief by next week.
DDA Richardson opposed, requiring two weeks to write his brief because he was occupied with other cases and the required legal research and writing.
Judge Wolk concluded the hearing in favor of the prosecution, maintaining the original timeline he established.