By Vanguard Court Watch Interns
On Monday, March 4, an arraignment for the James Mings case was held in Department 9.
In the fall of 2011, Mr. Mings turned himself in following the death of Kevin Seery in Davis, and Mr. Mings was subsequently charged with first degree murder. Jury selection for Mr. Mings’ trial was interrupted last week due to Deputy DA Martha Holzapfel’s unexpected illness.
Deputy DA Deanna Hayes chose to re-file the case, and Mr. Mings waived his rights to a preliminary hearing. Deputy DA Hayes also agreed to forego the preliminary hearing. Presiding Judge David Rosenberg set an arraignment for Tuesday, March 19, at 10 a.m. in Department 1.
The trial of James Mings ground to a halt on Wednesday of last week when Deputy DA Martha Holzapfel fell ill, causing Judge Richardson to send the jury home.
When the trial resumed on Thursday morning, Ms. Holzapfel was still ill. Her supervisor, Deputy DA Rob Gorman was supposed to take her place and select the jury.
However, differences of opinion in the evaluation of prospective jurors led Mr. Gorman to seek a continuance in the case.
Judge Richardson, mindful of the jurors’ desire to move the case along, made the decision to deny the request for the continuance. This led to Assistant Chief Deputy District Attorney Michael Cabral objecting, arguing that Mr. Gorman’s offer to get the trial started was done in good faith and the judge’s decision put their office at a disadvantage.
Mr. Mings was indicted on a charge of first degree murder of a Davis resident, which happened at the College Square apartments on J St back on October 1, 2011.
Mr. Mings claims he knew the victim briefly, but the victim was suffering with several illnesses and had asked him to end his suffering.
The victim, 42-year-old Kevin Seery, was reportedly suffering from a number of ailments which included diabetes, chronic pancreatitis, chronic hepatitis and pneumonia at the time of his death. He stood at 6-1 but weighed just 133 pounds.
According to news accounts at the time, Mr. Mings confessed to the killing, turned himself in and claimed that Mr. Seery had asked him to kill him.
Mr. Mings put Mr. Seery in a choke hold and then stuffed a variety of items into his throat, preventing Mr. Seery from breathing.
A Denied Motion to Suppress, A Plea of No Contest
By: Alexandra Rose
Yesterday, on the morning of Monday March 4, 2013, in Department 6 of the Yolo County Superior Court, routine hearings were taking place in front of the Honorary David W. Reed.
At 10:40 a.m., the judge called the case of Hector Damien Ramirez-Zarate. After being arrested on February 13, 2013, the defendant, Mr. Ramirez-Zarate, enlisted the help of Attorney Anthony J. Palik to represent him in court.
On February 19, 2013, Mr. Palik, on behalf of Mr. Ramirez-Zarate, personally delivered a copy of the notice of motion to suppress evidence at preliminary hearing, with the accompanying points and authorities, to the Office of the District Attorney for Yolo County.
The report began with a statement of facts about the case (several personal details relating to the defendant, such as home address, have been omitted for the sake of the defendant’s privacy):
“At approximately 7:30 p.m., on February 13, 2013, defendant RAMIREZ, who lives in a Mobile Home Park in West Sacramento, California, picked up his two-year old daughter at another home in the park located three spaces away from his own.”
“Because he was driving his vehicle only three spaces away from his own residence and would be driving this short distance at a speed of less than five miles per hour, he did not believe that a car seat was reasonably necessary and placed his daughter on his lap while driving that short distance.”
“Based on the circumstances of his later arrest, defendant is informed and believes that someone at the mobile home park notified police that they believed that Mr. RAMIREZ was intoxicated while he drove his car that short distance.”
“Approximately ten minutes later, and after defendant had parked his car at his residence, removed his daughter from the car, and was residing within his residence, an as-yet unidentified police officer employed by the West Sacramento Police Department contacted his household by knocking on the door of his residence.”
“The knock on the door was answered by the defendant’s spouse, GABRIELA RAMIREZ. After opening the door, the aforementioned police officer demanded that the defendant come outside of the residence so that the officer would speak with him there.”
“The defendant informed the officer that he would not come outside the residence. The police officer then informed the residents that he would enter the residence and arrest the defendant unless the defendant came outside the residence.”
“Without obtaining the consent of either the defendant or the defendant’s spouse, or from any other resident of lawful age who could provide consent, the officer entered the residence without the consent of the residents and without a search or arrest warrant and arrested the defendant.”
Mr. Palik argues that the warrantless entry of this police officer into this residence is unlawful, as there is neither consent nor an exigent circumstance that would justify the warrantless entry. Therefore, the motion to suppress evidence at the preliminary hearing should be granted.
Unsurprisingly, the court of law has seen many cases that involve these same circumstances, and the fourth amendment has been the source of much controversy in these cases. The case of Kentucky vs. King serves as a prime example that highlights the difficulty that law enforcing bodies face in balancing privacy interests of the accused with the necessity of allowing police to respond to changing circumstances.
Even so, Mr. Ramirez-Zarate’s motion to suppress was denied by the Court. In fact, the evidence would not even make it to Court; yesterday morning during his hearing, the defendant expressed his wish to enter a plea.
After obtaining, completing, and signing the plea agreement, Mr. Ramirez-Zarate handed his plea agreement to Mr. Palik, who then delivered it to Judge Reed to be reviewed.
The Court accepted the plea. Mr. Ramirez-Zarate pleaded no contest to count 3 of driving with a blood alcohol level of .08 or higher, admitted to the enhancement of having a blood alcohol level of .15 or higher, and admitted to the enhancement of having a minor child under the age of 14 as a passenger while driving under the influence. The representative of the People of the State of California would dismiss all other counts and enhancements in light of the plea agreement and justice.
Judge Reed stated that Mr. Ramirez-Zarate should be released from jail that day, as he had already served 2 days jail time for count 3, 4 days jail time for the high blood alcohol enhancement, and 2 days jail time for the additional underage passenger enhancement. Judge Reed also gave the defendant a $3,144 fine and 3 years of conditional probation.
A Successful Motion to Suppress
By Vanguard Court Watch Interns
Last Wednesday, Department 4 heard a successful motion to suppress evidence in the Terry Ingram and Ricky Hudman case. Mr. Brad Morrow was the prosecuting Deputy District Attorney, while Attorney Robert Spangler and Deputy Public Defender Sally Fredericksen represented Ms. Ingram and Mr. Hudman, respectively.
Mr. Hudman was checking their vehicle’s oil at a service station in Dunnigan when he and his sister, Ms. Ingram, were approached by Deputy Ryan Mez of the Yolo County Sheriff’s Department. He asked if they needed help or a tow truck, which they did not. Both exhibited symptoms that Deputy Mez suspected were due to their being under the influence of a controlled substance.
Upon questioning, Mr. Hudman replied that he had never done drugs, while Ms. Ingram responded and admitted to using meth two years prior. At this point, Deputy Mez asked her to step over to the patrol car, where he again queried her about her meth use and allegedly cussed her out. She admitted to doing meth a couple hours before, and that there was meth inside the vehicle. Deputy Mez asked Ms. Ingram to sit in the patrol car, where she remained uncuffed, but the door was closed.
Mr. Hudman consented to a search of both his person and their vehicle. When Deputy Mez couldn’t find the meth, he demanded to know where it was. Mr. Hudman handed over a cell phone case containing 0.49 grams of the controlled substance, and subsequently both Ms. Ingram and Mr. Hudman were detained.
There was a lot of debate as to whether or not the defendants were free to leave during the encounter, since their licenses were taken from them sometime around the beginning of the incident and not returned until at the jail. Although Ms. Ingram was ordered to sit in a patrol car with the doors shut, Deputy Mez insisted that no crime was committed until the meth was found, and therefore they were free to leave up until that point.
Additionally, much of the defense’s questioning of Deputy Mez focused on his failure to turn on the car cam in his patrol vehicle or the mobile microphone in his pocket. These two devices would have helped clarify what happened that night. Ultimately, Judge Rosenberg decided that, although troubling, this was not the issue in question.
After hearing from the arresting officer and both defendants, Judge Rosenberg ruled that Deputy Mez was out of line due to his aggressive and somewhat coercive interaction with Ms. Ingram and Mr. Hudman.
Although both Ms. Ingram and Mr. Hudman were under the influence of meth at the time of the incident, their testimony was determined to be credible, and the motion to suppress was subsequently granted. The charges against both defendants were dropped.
“Without obtaining the consent of either the defendant or the defendant’s spouse, or from any other resident of lawful age who could provide consent, the officer entered the residence without the consent of the residents and without a search or arrest warrant and arrested the defendant.”
I’m not the least bit surprised. All this was done, based on someone else’s words. Not much probable cause, it seems. Sounds a lot like like Solano Co. cops.
We are becoming a police state. It is frightening.
If they are willing to do that for a DUI, what else are they willing to do that for?
About the Zarate case: The “report” was created by the defense. I’m willing to bet the police had a little more information than the Vanguard has provided The Vanguards reporting also doesn’t include the prosecutions arguments that were apparently pretty good. The warrantless entry into a home to arrest an individual for DUI has been upheld by the courts numerous times. When Mr. Palic argued that no exigency existed to enter the house he was obviously wrong. The exigency was the destruction of evidence as alcohol is constantly being burned off by the body. I hope Mr Palic works for the public defender and individuals don’t have to pay out of pocket for his services.
If being OK with the police going into a house to arrest a person who drives a motor vehicle with a toddler unsecured in their lap while at least double the legal limit means I want a police state, we’ll I guess I want a police state.
There are other justifiable reasons besides exigent circumstances….
Oh,wait this is Vanguard court watch — never mind.
A neighbor possibly told the police they observed a man drive the lenghth of 3 houses while appearing to be intoxicated, in a parking lot, and then drive the length of 3 houses back to his own house? Maybe there is more to this story? Did the neighbor repeatedly see the man drive drunk? Then of course it is sensible to call the cops. Did the neighbor have a personal beef with the defendant? If I’m mad at my neighbor and I live in Davis, I can just make up a story about the person and call the cops, and the cops can do a home invasion on the person I’m mad at? Geez.
JD, I doubt your scenario with more unknowns than knowns would happen. Please find a situation where it did. It also wouldn’t be a home invasion if it is a practice that upheld by the courts. Calling a lawful entry into a home by the police a “home invasion” implies it is a criminal act.
JD, your irrelevant what ifs, are funny. For example repeated sightings have nothing do do with the (then) current reported offense.