By David M. Greenwald
Executive Editor
Los Angeles, CA – In a victory for the State and HCD (Housing and Community Development), an appellate court on Thursday affirmed a trial court judgment dismissing the petition to set aside HCD’s housing needs determination.
Filing the suit was the Orange County Council of Governments (OCCOG) and several cities including Redondo Beach, Lakewood, Torrance, Cerritos, Downey and Whittier.
In 2009, the Fourth District Court of Appeal held in re: Irvine “that a local government’s allocation of the regional housing needs assessment (RHNA) made under Government Code section 65584 et seq. is precluded from judicial review.”
The court in the current case “conclude[s] City of Irvine’s reasoning applies to plaintiffs’ contentions concerning the Department of Housing’s RHNA determination such that plaintiffs’ action is barred.”
UC Davis Law Professor Chris Elmendorf tweeted on Thursday, “Outcome was expected, it’s still good news–courts are letting the political & admin process work.”
Under the law, the Department of Housing is “tasked with . . . determining the regional housing needs assessment for each regional planning body (known as a “council of governments”) in the State, and reviewing and approving housing elements of local governments to meet the housing needs of their communities.”
Each city and county is then required to adopt a general plan which includes a housing element. The Department of Housing oversees the RHNA process.
On September 18, 2019, Southern California Association of Governments submitted a formal objection to the Department of Housing’s draft determination of regional housing needs.
They received 52 appeals from local governments, but all but two were denied.
As a result, the plaintiffs filed a petition that sought to direct the Department of Housing “to vacate and set aside” its RHNA determination for the region.
Plaintiffs argue that this is because the Department of Housing’s RHNA determination is based on “[The Department of Housing’s] use of the wrong population forecast, comparable region, and vacancy rates, as well as new methodology that includes overcrowding and cost burdening factors that [the Department of Housing] did not previously consider in its typical methodology for prior housing cycles.”
The trial court agreed with the Department of Housing who filed demurrers arguing that the court lacked jurisdiction over the RHNA challenges based on the ruling in re: Irvine.
The plaintiffs attempted to distinguish between the Irvine case, arguing “because they are challenging the preliminary determination of regional housing needs by the Department of Housing, not the later allocation of housing by SC Association of Governments,” that it’s reviewable by court. The court disagreed.
In City of Irvine, “the court broadly held that ‘the statutes governing the RHNA allocation procedure . . . reflect a clear intent to preclude judicial intervention in the process’ . . . .”
In other words, “City of Irvine’s reasoning was not limited solely to analyzing SC Association of Governments’ allocation of the regional housing need to Irvine. City of Irvine considered the greater RHNA process, and the Department of Housing’s role and vested authority in it, concluding that judicial review was precluded.”
The court noted that allowing judicial review of the Department of Housing’s RHNA determination “would interfere with the administrative process and be both unmanageable and cause unreasonable delay.”
The court added, “Concluding that judicial review of the Department of Housing’s RHNA determination is appropriate here would essentially render City of Irvine’s and City of Coronado’s holdings meaningless, as a local government could challenge the entire RHNA allocation process by challenging the Department of Housing’s initial RHNA determination.”
As such the court ruled, “We will not construe City of Irvine ‘in a manner that is inconsistent with its reasoning and would evade the legislatively imposed limits on judicial review that the court sought to enforce.’”
This is an excellent ruling by the appellate court to uphold precedent and strike just more NIMBY obstructionism and stalling for time. Both tactics are typical of NIMBYs.