Task Force and Kroll Find Pepper Spray Not a Reasonable Use of Force; Hammers Chancellor and Lt. Pike –
The findings of the long-awaited Pepper-Spray Report are basic and succinctly summarized in the introduction: “The pepper-spraying incident that took place on November 18, 2011 should and could have been prevented.” They find that “the decision to use pepper spray was not supported by objective evidence and was not authorized by policy.”
The report paints a damning picture of the university’s response to the protests from the top to the bottom, including indecisiveness by Chancellor Katehi and an unreasonable use of force by Lt. John Pike.
Kroll supported their conclusion that use of pepper spray was not a reasonable use of force by stating, “This conclusion is buttressed by the facts that the MK-9 was not an authorized weapon under UCDPD guidelines and that UCDPD officers were not trained in its use.”
The blame is placed primarily on Lt. Pike for the manner in which the decision was made: “Lt. Pike bears primary responsibility for the objectively unreasonable decision to use pepper spray on the students sitting in a line and for the manner in which the pepper spray was used.”
Huge amount of blame was placed on the chancellor, both for indecisiveness and for countermanding tactical decisions that should have been reserved for police authorities, such as the decision to deploy police to clear the Quad at 3 pm rather than in the middle of the night.
However, at least initially it seems that President Mark Yudof has issued a vote of confidence.
He indicated that, while he has not given the report a full reading, “Even a cursory reading of the report confirms what we have known from the start: Friday, Nov. 18 was a bad day for the UC Davis community and for the entire UC system.”
In what seems like a vote of confidence, he continued: “We can and must do better. I look forward to working with Chancellor Katehi to repair the damage caused by this incident and to move this great campus forward.”
Moreover, the report finds, “The Chancellor bears primary responsibility for the failure to communicate her position that the police operation should avoid physical force.”
The report would hammer the administration for making assumptions about the presence of outsiders, or “non-affiliates” without properly investigating whether this was in fact true, and as it turns out, the report finds that it was not.
The Task Force reports, “Kroll indicates that it has been ‘unable to identify the legal basis for the decision of the Leadership Team to act against the protesters and for the operation mounted by the UCDPD.’ “
The Kroll report states, “The video that went viral and sparked the international concern about this event was the pepper spraying of the seated line of protesters by Lieutenant Pike and then of a smaller portion of them acting at Lieutenant Pike’s direction. This leads to the obvious question: Why did Lieutenant Pike deploy pepper spray?”
The report discounts the defense used by many that they were surrounded by a hostile mob and the use of pepper spray was necessary to clear the path for the officers and the arrestees to leave the Quad.
They write, “While there is some support for this conclusion, a detailed review of the objective evidence undermines this conclusion.”
In fact, they report an officer whose name was redacted was able to walk arrestees through the crowd to a waiting squad car and Officer P “was able to step over the line of seated protesters and walk through the crowd to meet with the Davis PD who arrived to provide mutual aid.”
Moreover, “Lt. Pike’s actions and body language include stepping over the seated protesters to get to their faces, a move that would not generally be undertaken with a hostile crowd.”
The Task Force writes: “On balance, there is little factual basis supporting Lt. Pike’s belief that he was trapped by the protesters or that his officers were prevented from leaving the Quad. Further, there is little evidence that any protesters attempted to use violence against the police.”
Kroll concludes, “Considering all the available evidence – while recognizing that Kroll investigators were not able to interview Lieutenant Pike to learn and report on his state of mind at the moment he used the pepper spray – the deployment of pepper spray does not appear to have been an objectively reasonable use of force.” The Task Force agreed with taht assessment.
The blame is primarily put on Pike, and this is the conclusion both of Kroll and the Task Force, who write, “We agree with Kroll’s conclusion that Lieutenant Pike’s use of force in pepper spraying seated protesters was objectively unreasonable.”
Again they note that, while the crowd chanted that they would not let them go, they largely lacked the cohesion and capacity to carry out those chants.
The Task Force writes: “However, a more careful review reveals several facts that conflict with that belief and which the commanders should have known. For instance, there were breaks in the circle around the officers. Where the circle was unbroken, the line was often still only one- or two-people deep, some of whom were seated, and many of whom may have been observers – crowding around to see what would happen – not protesters.”
The more hostile chants were shouted down by the majority of the crowd.
Moreover, as we have argued: “Nor did they appear to reflect an actual intent by the crowd to prevent police from leaving with their prisoners. In fact, it was during one of the ‘If you let them go, we will let you leave’ chants that [an officer] was able to leave, escorting an arrestee to an awaiting police car by simply walking him straight through the crowd, without incident or force escalation.”
They conclude: “On balance, the evidence does not provide an objective, factual basis for Lt. Pike’s purported belief that he was trapped, that any of his officers were trapped, or that the safety of their arrestees was at issue.”
In fact, the Task Force hammers Lt. Pike arguing: “Lt. Pike is also responsible for the specific pepper spray weapon he used, the MK-9, and the manner in which he used it. The MK-9 is not an authorized weapon under UCDPD guidelines. UCDPD officers were not trained in how to use it correctly. And Lt. Pike did not use it correctly. The MK-9 is a higher pressure type of pepper spray than what officers normally carry on their utility belts (MK-4). It is designed for crowd dispersal rather than field applications and “[t]he recommended minimum distance for . . . application of the MK-9 is six feet.” Lt. Pike appeared to be spraying protesters at a much closer distance than 6 feet.”
The report begins with the notion that was expressed by Chancellor Linda Katehi – that her concerns revolved around the involvement of “non-affiliates.”
Chancellor Katehi stated, “We were worried at the time about that [nonaffiliates] because the issues from Oakland were in the news and the use of drugs and sex and other things, and you know here we have very young students . . . we were worried especially about having very young girls and other students with older people who come from the outside without any knowledge of their record . . . if anything happens to any student while we’re in violation of policy, it’s a very tough thing to overcome.”
But the report hammers the administration for failure to properly investigate this assumption: “The Task Force concludes that the failure to conduct any additional investigation into the presence of non-affiliates in the encampment was a significant error in the Leadership Team’s decision-making process.”
And indeed, though the information was at the time directly challenged by Student Affairs staff and volunteers, the assertion was unsubstantiated and ultimately proven to be largely untrue.
Writes the Task Force, “Still, one might reasonably decide that even when confronted with uncertainty as to the existence or extent of risks to students, the prudent course would be to intervene immediately to ensure student safety. That decision presupposes that there were no reasonable alternative means available to the administration other than ordering the tents to be removed immediately to adequately ameliorate the risk to students.”
They continue: “The Task Force has received no information describing the extent to which the Leadership Team considered alternatives to the immediate deployment of the police. It is difficult to avoid the conclusion that the Leadership Team’s analysis of alternatives seems inconsistent and incomplete.”
The use of force directive is unclear. Vice Chancellor Meyer told the Task Force, “He did not understand that Chancellor Katehi believed that no force at all would be employed in taking down the tents until her comments following the November 18 police action.”
On the other hand, it appears that, at least initially, Chief Spicuzza argued against the use of force and against the wearing of riot gear, but the Police Department’s pre-event November 15 operations plan, however, stated that “the use of force is highly likely in this type of situation based on past events,” and it forecast the potential use of pepper ball guns and pepper spray (although not the MK 9 canister that they actually used in the event). Senior officers in the Department also believed that the use of physical force might well be required to conduct the operation.”
The Vanguard will have much more on this in the coming hours.
—David M. Greenwald reporting
Will the Vanguard publish the report in its entirety, or just give us excerpts of the Vanguard’s choosing and accompanying commentary? I, for one, would like to read the entire report for myself. Can you give us a link to it, if nothing else?
I posted a link on the other article
Here is another link ([url]https://davisvanguard.org/images/stories/authors/reynoso-report.pdf[/url])
My very early take, I think Pike is gone and probably going to be charged criminally, although you never know with this DA. Spicuzza is gone. Katehi is in deep trouble. She looks incompetent in the report.
I read most of the report (not every word). Perhaps now the people on this blog who have stood by the “threat” to police will realize how impertinent that is. The police come and go during the chanting of the “threat” with no hint of violence or pending violence.
I sure wonder why the police had disallowed pepper spray in their possession.
I think it’s great Kroll and the Task Force both make this point because it was the chief point of contention perpetuated by a video that purports to show the whole story but leaves out too much context. The wider shots showed considerable holes in the protesters, the fact that police were moving in and out of the line, and even transported the arrestees out without incident which is something people like Octane and Rusty were arguing didn’t happen.
I’m still reading, but my first suggestion for reform is, The Leadership Team needs a new name, something they can live up to.
The Chancellor comes across as not knowing what her subordinates were doing.
If you look back at the Univ of Illinois information when she ran the admissions program, she denied knowing that her subordinates were running a special admissions program for the sons and daughters of wealthy alums and boosters.
There was a state investigation, but I dont know if they were able to pin her down that she knew about it; she claimed under oath that she did not.
If I were the attorney for the student plaintiffs, I would subpoena the Univ of Ill investigation documents, and compare her wide-eyed “I did not know what my staff were doing” to the current UCD “I didnt know what my staff were doing.”
When the Davis Vanguard ran its articles several years ago about the UCD potential employment of her, I think I was the only poster who strongly suggested that UCD NOT hire her, as she obviously knew about what her U of I subordinates were doing (basically trading dollars for admissions), or was so clueless that she did not know. Either outcome should have disqualified her.
Fast forward to today: same thing.
The University should fire her.
One thing is clear. Cory Golden got punked by Pike’s attorney. People rip the Vanguard for being biased, I hope Cory Golden got paid for running that PR piece.
I guess we didn’t read the same report. The report I read is an unsparing portrait of a headless administration, too inept to manage a relatively small and totally manageable non-event.
Just updated the story with quotes from Yudof that seem to indicate he will not be firing Chancellor Katehi:
“We can and must do better. I look forward to working with Chancellor Katehi to repair the damage caused by this incident and to move this great campus forward.”
That seems premature.
Neutral: who is your comment addressing?
I doubt anyone under Katehi will testify that she told everyone NOT to use force. She is probably going to resign soon, so why would anyone take the hit for her?
Premature once again!
Sounds like what Chancellor said post incident.
DMG: [i]Neutral: who is your comment addressing?[/i]
Yours: [i]The report paints a damning picture of the university’s response to the protests from the top to the bottom . . .[/i]
The ‘damning picture’ doesn’t reach below a police lieutenant.
Technically I think you are correct, but the report goes from the Chancellor to the Vice Chancellor to the Leadership team to the Chief to Lt. Pike, we can parse words in that technically there is one level lower to go, but I do wonder what the responsibility of an officer is at that point.
David. Do not understand your 2:30 post.
So there is no justification for the use of violence by authorities on non-violent protestors. I’m glad the report validates that statement.
Futhermore, the task force recommends that, in the future, the administration
“Accurately identify and clearly describe and communicate the legal basis for theUniversity’s response to any protest or instance of civil disobedience.”
I’d say not identifying the legal basis is pretty damning picture for the administration.
Neutral is suggesting that the problem does not go from top to bottom, or at least the report does not hammer officials from top to bottom.
I am arguing he is technically correct but for all intents and purposes the problem starts at teh chancellor and goes down to the Lt. I’m still trying to see where the report talks about the specific officers.
An interesting footnote in the Kroll report. While Lt Pike refused to be interviewed footnote 3 on page 7 of the Kroll report says:
“Kroll was provided with a lengthy statement by Lieutenant Pike regarding the November 18 incident.”
David, could this statement be obtained via a freedom of information request? This may be the only opportunity we have to hear Lt Pike’s voice in this entire situation.
This also as a footnote in the Kroll report (page 8, footnote 5):
“None of the ten arrestees or eight possible pepper spray targets identified by Kroll agreed to be interviewed, for instance.”
I wonder if any of them regret not agreeing to be interviewed?
From the UC Davis website:
April 11 Reynoso task force public meeting webcast
The Reynoso task force public meeting will be at Freeborn Hall from 3:30 to 5 p.m. and the webcast will begin at 3:30 p.m.
Please return to this page [www.ucdavis.edu] at that time to view the webcast.
Why weren’t the protestors agree to be interviewed?
After carefully reading the entire report (a 2 1/2 hour task), I think that the information given is too complex for a “fire Katehi” summation. I thought that the Police Chief appears to be a glaring weakness, both on that day and in general. She clearly did not know how to interact with campus leadership, nor her officers. The description of her being spotted by one of the officers of her in the crowd, filming with her cell phone camera, must have been a shocking moment of clarity that no one was in charge.
I, too, read the entire report and I found that while there were breakdowns in communication, quite frankly the police chief was truly incompetent. Katehi clearly told staff she didn’t want another Berkeley – surely no one can believe she meant use pepper spray instead of batons.
The author of this blog uses an article title that doesn’t begin to convey the nuances and laddering of screw-ups in this case. John Meyer should probably have to resign. I feel like this article should be authored “David Greenwald reporting for Fox News”.
[quote] “Lt. Pike is also responsible for the specific pepper spray weapon he used, the MK-9, and the manner in which he used it. The MK-9 is not an authorized weapon under UCDPD guidelines. UCDPD officers were not trained in how to use it correctly. And Lt. Pike did not use it correctly. The MK-9 is a higher pressure type of pepper spray than what officers normally carry on their utility belts (MK-4). It is designed for crowd dispersal rather than field applications and “[t]he recommended minimum distance for . . . application of the MK-9 is six feet.” Lt. Pike appeared to be spraying protesters at a much closer distance than 6 feet.”
[/quote]
This is criminal behavior. Lt. Pike needs to be prosecuted.
Katehi clearly showed poor judgement and its hard to see how she can survive.
Here is my take after reading the report, w/o having read the actual Kroll report:
I don’t agree with the report’s conclusion that it was not necessary to take the tents down in the Quad immediately, that it could have waited for several days. To wait that long would have allowed for entrenchment of the protestors, and invited the kind of dangers that occurred in other Occupy encampments. Better to not let it even get started. However, any call for delay should have been to wait until the cover of night, and removed the protestors/tents quietly under the cover of darkness when fewer students were around to gather as a mob in support, and when cameras were not around. Or as someone suggested, turn the sprinklers on at night, and drive the protestors out that way – through mild discomfort.
It does not appear it was clear and unambiguous that Katehi ever gave an order that there was to be no violence. Furthermore, proper administrative protocols were completely ignored. This led to self-determinationn in the field on the spot, instead of thinking things through ahead of time (NIMS/SEMS), which is what is required in situations like these. However, the conclusion the report implies that a NIMS/SEMS analysis would have determined there was no necessity for removing the tents immediately is not necessarily supported by the evidence – problems had occurred at other Occupy sites, so it was not unreasonable to infer the same might occur at UCD, something that should be discouraged fairly quickly.
The university didn’t even know if taking down tents during the day was a lawful exercise. They essentially just guessed at it, and hoped for the best, and essentially gave instructions to the police to remove the tents whether lawful or not. So they could not clearly communicate to the protestors that what the protestors were doing was indeed unlawful. Apparently the confused and ambiguous orders to take down the tents was passed on from the university administration to the police department, who assumed it was an “executive order”. There was a complete break down of any reasonable kind of command and control system as is normally employed in an emergency situation like this. It would appear everyone pretty much seemed to be flying by the seat of their pants. This is where I think the police get the idea this report “exonerates” them.
However, it also appears the police did not follow proper NIMS/SEMS protocols either, adding to the already escalating confusion. The report concedes there was some evidence the police felt threatened, but does not feel it rose to the level of requiring pepper-spray against protestors. Bc Lt. Pike refused to be interviewed, we have no idea what was in his mind at the time. But certainly he does not appear in the video to look as if he feels particularly threatened. What is appalling however is that a weapon was used that was not authorized, and that the police under Cheif Spicuzza do not even follow her orders but essentially “do their own thing”. That is appalling and unacceptable, and surely needs to be addressed posthaste. Nor does it appear proper police tactics were used for crowd control. Frankly, I would say some intensive training is in order. Blame is squarely placed on Katehi for making the tactical decision for the police to move in at 3 pm in the afternoon. My question is why did Chief Spicuzza abdicate her responsibility to make the decisions? There is a real breakdown in leadership and a bleeding over of decisionmaking from one improper person to another that is completely inappropriate.
One thing that disappoints me is that students were given a “free pass” in this report. It is not that I want them punished, but it is the students who precipitated this entire mess with nasty chants, and ineffectual attempts to encircle the police and make it difficult for arrests to be made. Nevertheless, the university and the university police have to be held to higher standards. Clearly both the administration/police are at fault, and better training is in order. Certainly Pike should be punished for the use of an unauthorized weapon. The reforms called for in this report seem very reasonable and necessary. Now that I have read the report, I would much prefer to make the corrections, and move on rather than worry about exacting “pounds of flesh”…
@ Elaine – After this incident, the tents were set back up again. In fact, there were 75 tents set up on the Quad for several months. There was no “entrenchment” of protestors, no “dangers”, so your reasoning fails.
Officers felt afraid because they had no training and had never experienced any like this before, no briefing on exactly what they were supposed to accomplish and why, no leadership during the action.
Cruz Reynoso said at the briefing that the Kroll people (veteran police officers) were appalled by how the UCD police department functions and acted on that day, that there was no reason for thinking that they were in danger at any point. Read the Kroll report. It specifically describes reports of police officers lying in their reports, saying that they were attacked, but the video records of that day clearly show evidence to the contrary.
Elaine – you’ve been told repeatedly what happened on that day by witnesses who have posted here. The reports support what people have stated that happened on that day.
The students were not violating any law or University policy at 3:00 pm on a Friday afternoon. They repeatedly asked what law that they were violating and, when officers did respond, they didn’t fit with what the students were doing. Even the “nasty chants,” did not violate any policy or law. This is why the DA chose not to prosecute. They would not win.
Come over to the Quad some lunch time and listen to the anti-abortion people, the religious people and others, setting up their offensive displays and shouting their hateful messages and try to tell me honestly that what the students were doing on that day rises anywhere near what we witness on a frequent basis. Ask yourself why these people are protected, but you feel you need to condemn the students.
I don’t feel that the students got off “scott-free.” Remember, they were violently taken in to custody, pepper-sprayed in the face and threatened with prosecution. Some suffered long-term physical injury.
That’s a good point Ryan. Elaine: what more do you want to happen to the students?
I think we will be sifting through new nuggets for days to come. I’m going to type up the report on today’s event tomorrow morning so I can spend the evening with my family. But there were some remarkable statements made by the task force.
The amazing thing about some of them is they come not university personnel. Kroll was appalled by what they saw and they saw no reason for the pepper spray.
Everything I’ve seen in the report is previously known. Nothing unexpected.
This is old news.
I’ve read the main body of the Reynoso report, although not the Kroll report or other appendices. My takes are as follows:
Reynoso Report – It appears to me that the Reynoso report was well done and does not appear to be biased. Additionally, this leads me to believe that the Kroll Report was also well done and unbiased, given that the Reynoso Report does not point out any shortcomings of it in its own report.
Katehi – I think she survives just fine and see no reason for her to consider resignation. My biggest issue with her is the lack of a well documented scope for the action to remove the tents. This poor communications led to many other problems. I don’t know whether implementation of SEMS is her responsibility or the Police Chief’s and/or whether or not Katehi should be expected to know about SEMS. If implementing SEMS should have been at least in part her responsibility, I think that that was her biggest mistake. There was discussion regarding the time of the tent removal. I frankly view it as the Police Chief’s responsibility to inform Katehi that the time is a tactical issue that needs to be determined by the Police Chief. I didn’t know that and wouldn’t necessarily expect Katehi to know that. Spicuzza should have spoken up more forcefully, if she spoke out at all on the issue. Another significant shortcoming was Katehi’s failure to determine whether they had a legal basis for requiring the removal of the tents. However, if she thought that no force would be used, then maybe this is less of an issue. Again, she failed to communicate the limited scope of the police action to everyone. I’d like to hear Katehi’s reasons for discounting Castro’s claims that the protestors were basically all students and faculty. I do understand the desire and the legitimacy of trying to prevent an encampment from forming early on, even if they are initially all UCD affiliated protestors. She would have been persecuted had something bad happened and she had not acted to remove the tents.
Meyers – He should have played a much more active role in ensuring the SEMS was in place and in better understanding what was going on with the Police Department since the Police Chief reports to him. Much of the same blame I would place on Katehi should also go to Meyers, if not more – in my opinion. Katehi should have been able to rely upon Meyers to oversee the handling of the protest. I believe that he was the individual coordinating with the UC System and other campuses regarding the handling of protests and protestors.
Spicuzza – Wow! She doesn’t have control of her officers, they don’t listen to her, she doesn’t clearly communicate the fact that Katehi is impinging upon tactical issues when setting the time, and/or what the possible risks are of having an afternoon tent removal action. She doesn’t convey to Katehi that her officers strongly object to the afternoon time, or that they expect violence and intend to where riot gear. She doesn’t invoke SEMS and she stands in the crowd taking pictures or video from her phone of her officers’ actions as she calls in direction to her officers from the “peanut gallery”. Spicuzza was the biggest problem and somehow or another, she will have to go. After what has occured, and frankly even before then from what the report indicates, she was and is unable to command her own officers and she will have not have the confidence of any part of the UC Davis community. Had Spicuzza done her job more effectively none of this would have likely occurred.
Pike – This officer appears to have made a number of bad decisions including the use of pepper spray at all and the use of a pepper spray that was unauthorized. It does not appear that anyone directed him to use the pepper spray, but that he decided to use it on his own, so he should face consequences. (Will be interesting to see if he says that someone else instructed him to use it.) However, I doubt that his actions will quite rise to the level of being considered criminal, and hence he will likely keep his job, despite the fact that he will have a difficult time being a police officer in Davis going forward. I’d strongly consider leaving UCD Police and joining another police department if anyone else will have him.
Incident Commander – The Incident Commander was clearly not doing his job. Because of his lack of leadership and planning, which includes failing to have a SEMS plan in place and the lack of a clear legal basis for the removal of the tents, he played a major role in allowing the events to play out the way they did that afternoon. It sounds like he believed that violence could and would likely occur, so he can’t use the same excuse as I’ll allow Katehi that force would not be used by the police. Had he had a plan for removing arrested protestors expeditiously, the pepper spraying never would have happened. It also sounds like it may have been the incident commander who made the poor decision about wearing riot gear, which simply helps to escalate the situation. That was a tactical error in my opinion.
That’s my two cents.
UCD Police – I also agree that the UCD Police appears to be a highly dysfunctional entity that doesn’t know how to appropriately handle a student protest situation appropriately or effectively.
Among the maybe hundred questions that arise from this report are:
How did a prohibited pepper spray end up in the UCD Police Department inventory? There has to be a purchase order somewhere.
Is it the practice for the UCD Police Chief to “argue” for policy and procedure in her department? Does she know that she is authorized to command such direction? If her orders were ignored, as the report remarks, are charges of insubordination by her two senior subordinates being pursued?
In all fairness, Chief Spicuzza has been portrayed in a manner that questions her competence and leadership on even a basic level. Yet, these unequivocal condemnations set forth in both reports are rendered with no input from her. She’s been told to maintain silence on legal grounds, but she probably never recover from this even if she later had a defense to present. She’s probably lost the battle before even stepping onto the battlefield.
Plenty of blame to go around but the decision to use pepper spray still seems to rest with Pike as I stated before.
Although the ability to understand the state of mind of officer Pike is beyond the scope of both Kroll and Reynoso as an anonymous poster I stand by my previous conclusion that the chant of “F the police” set Pike off. As a result Pike must face sanctions. Police are supposed to be able to handle such verbal abuse and we can’t allow the police to use excessive force in such cases where their emotions interfere with the dispassionate exercise of their responsibilities. To allow such force would undermine the rule of law. The question that remains for him is what is the appropriate penalty. My personal opinion is that he should lose his officer rank and probably needs to be transfered out of town. Others, I am sure, will call for his resignation. In the end no matter what happens to him people will be unhappy and what constitutes justice for his actions will be hotly debated until the final punishment is handed down.
I find it ironic that UC insists on paying top administrators a salary of $200,000 plus per year to attract “qualified” employees, yet this episode reads like a high school soap opera – bad communication, bad management, bad training, and bad execution. (As a sidebar, it appears that they never did obtain legal advice justifying the take down of the tents, or at least I did not see what the advice was in the report.)
Spicuzza is the real weak leak throughout the report – errors of commission and ommission. Castro is the one voice of reason. Interesting when Castro requested alternatives to the immediate tent take down during the conferece call – silence from the $200,000 plus folks.
A few point of clarification for the crowd. Students, and especially those that were pepper sprayed/arrested didn’t feel comfortable testifying in the report for several reason. First, the pending criminal charges against those that had been arrested made it nearly impossible for the students to give clear and open testimony of the events without fear that such interviews would eventually be subpoenaed. As many of you may remember, it wasn’t until a couple of months later that the DA decided not to press charges (but the charges were never officially “dropped,” leaving further prosecution an option for a period of 12 months from the incident). Secondly, the manner in which the Kroll investigators contacted students was unprofessional and bordered on the “creepy.” E-mails (David, these can be provided upon request) were sent to student’s accounts without identifying the senders or their affiliation, asking for vague interviews or petitions for information. Research later showed that these e-mail were coming from former or current police officers. Given past interactions with police at UC Davis, there was not a whole lot of confidence placed in the ability for the police to investigate their own, nor did the students have reason to place trust in such individuals. A guarantee of anonymity and/or immunity would have gone a long way to quell these fears and aid in student participation. Given these concerns, attorneys for the students explicitly advised them to not participate in any investigation. In this way the report in considerably incomplete, as to my knowledge it contains no student views, opinions, or recollections of the event. Thankfully there was a glut of video evidence.
What the report acknowledges in this instance (and what students have been saying for years), is that there is complete and utter mismanagement of the UCDPD as well as a continued policy of force on students to quell non-violent, peaceful, and legally protected speech. The report fails to recognize that these policies and practices have been ongoing for years, at least since the 2009 Mrak arrests (particularly in the case of Breanna Holmes and the March 4th incident), but probably before then as well. The only difference here was the substantial amount of recording that took place on Nov. 18th, as well as the clearly exhibited callousness of Lt. Pike. But again, this is nothing new. Police brutality has been on ongoing problem on this campus, and will continue to be if changes are not made to the leadership, training, and culture of the department.
The report also leaves out the abuses suffered by the students post arrest. Many students were denied medical care while in police custody, and there was a clearly documented case of sexual harassment of a female student that the Kroll report conveniently omitted. Again, this points to the lack of professionalism, training, and leadership of the UCDPD as a whole.
Sadly, Katehi, Meyer, and Wood will all probably escape with their jobs, salaries, and pensions in tact, despite their willful neglect and gross mismanagement. As I mentioned before, these abuses have been ongoing, and this is something that the administration was readily aware of; something that will hopefully be proven in the student’s ongoing lawsuit. Whether it was by neglect, incompetence, or malice that the administration failed to respond to these incidents remains to be seen, but what is clear, is that they have no place running a major university. While the reasons for their malfeasance is unclear, it is the fact that it happened, and happened repeatedly that is of major concern. In my opinion, the senior administration, as well as the senior leadership in the UCDPD should all be replaced. If this sort of act had occurred almost anywhere else, in any other kind of professional setting, steps would have already been taken to remove these people from their positions, as the only thing they’ve proven, is that they were the only real threat to student safety. As the Kroll report points out, at no time were protesters violent (as has been the case at all other UCD protests), but plenty of students have been injured at the hands of the police and the directions of the administration.
[i]”I find it ironic that UC insists on paying top administrators a salary of $200,000 plus per year to attract “qualified” employees, yet this episode reads like a high school soap opera – bad communication, bad management, bad training, and bad execution. (As a sidebar, it appears that they never did obtain legal advice justifying the take down of the tents, or at least I did not see what the advice was in the report.)”[/i]
I get your point here, but I am a bit confused about what we should expect. Isn’t the primary job to educate the students?
I find it completely ironic that these kids’ protesting was about the increased tuition which has been at least partially driven by increased administrative/operational costs. But the lesson learned here is the university must invest in additional training and contingency plans to deal with protesting mobs of students… thus increasing administrative and operational costs. Similarily, there will be payouts for retired heads that roll. And then there is the replacement recruiting and hiring that adds additional costs.
I have said it before… the occupy movement needs an injection of MBA students to do some math.
One more thought and then I am checking out of this topic because frankly I find it boring in consideration of more important and pressing issues…
…in the report there are several comments that UCD management and the UC police were concerned about UCD protests getting out of hand like the Berkeley protests. I really dislike Einstein-in-hindsight-armchair-quarterbacks, but I dislike them more when they ignore important bits of root cause to draw their “I’m smarter than you” conclusions. It would wonderful if we could all read minds and predict the future; but since we cannot we make risk assessments based on the facts around us. The facts around UCD management and UCD law enforcement at that time were that these protests could get out of hand. I’m not defending the actions of either, but this mindset was certainly a factor and it deserves greater consideration.
dmg: “That’s a good point Ryan. Elaine: what more do you want to happen to the students?”
Here is what I said: “One thing that disappoints me is that students were given a “free pass” in this report. It is not that I want them punished, but it is the students who precipitated this entire mess with nasty chants, and ineffectual attempts to encircle the police and make it difficult for arrests to be made. Nevertheless, the university and the university police have to be held to higher standards.”
Nowhere do I advocate punishing students. Perhaps I did not make my point clearly enough. The reason I am concerned that the students were not blameless is to add context, and why I don’t necessarily think it appropriate to demand a “pound of flesh” from university administrators/police. It is clear the university nor university police followed NIMS/SEMS for whatever reason. It also seems apparent that they need training in this protocol, as well as drills in implementing it. Obviously mistakes were made. But unless it can be shown the mistakes are a pattern of conduct, I see no reason to advocate “heads shall roll”. Hope that makes my position more understandable…
Ryan Kelly: “@ Elaine – After this incident, the tents were set back up again. In fact, there were 75 tents set up on the Quad for several months. There was no “entrenchment” of protestors, no “dangers”, so your reasoning fails.”
What happened after the fact is irrelevant. What the perception was before the fact is what matters. There were many instances where Occupiers turned violent, crime was rampant at a number of sites, as was rat infestation. It was not unreasonable for the university to be concerned about that possibility if they permitted a “tent city” to form on the Quad. Secondly, it seems pretty clear overnight camping on the Quad was illegal. It is the legality of daytime camping that was in question. As far as the students protesting, there was nothing illegal about that until students chose to surround the police (which the Reynoso report concedes) and shout threatening chants to indicate the police would not be permitted to leave with their arrestees (which the Reynoso report also concedes). That is where the students were not blameless. Nevertheless, I have always said that what the students did was not at a level warranting the use of pepper-spray. It seems pretty clear from the Reynoso report that the university/police should have waited to quietly arrest students after dark, when what the students were doing would have clearly been illegal; and there would not have been a camera and surrounding students to make the job more difficult.
newshoundpm: “Katehi – I think she survives just fine and see no reason for her to consider resignation. My biggest issue with her is the lack of a well documented scope for the action to remove the tents. This poor communications led to many other problems. I don’t know whether implementation of SEMS is her responsibility or the Police Chief’s and/or whether or not Katehi should be expected to know about SEMS. If implementing SEMS should have been at least in part her responsibility, I think that that was her biggest mistake. There was discussion regarding the time of the tent removal. I frankly view it as the Police Chief’s responsibility to inform Katehi that the time is a tactical issue that needs to be determined by the Police Chief. I didn’t know that and wouldn’t necessarily expect Katehi to know that. Spicuzza should have spoken up more forcefully, if she spoke out at all on the issue. Another significant shortcoming was Katehi’s failure to determine whether they had a legal basis for requiring the removal of the tents. However, if she thought that no force would be used, then maybe this is less of an issue. Again, she failed to communicate the limited scope of the police action to everyone…”
Spot on!
Phil Coleman: “Is it the practice for the UCD Police Chief to “argue” for policy and procedure in her department? Does she know that she is authorized to command such direction? If her orders were ignored, as the report remarks, are charges of insubordination by her two senior subordinates being pursued?
In all fairness, Chief Spicuzza has been portrayed in a manner that questions her competence and leadership on even a basic level. Yet, these unequivocal condemnations set forth in both reports are rendered with no input from her. She’s been told to maintain silence on legal grounds, but she probably never recover from this even if she later had a defense to present. She’s probably lost the battle before even stepping onto the battlefield.”
Fair point…
OneDJ: “I find it ironic that UC insists on paying top administrators a salary of $200,000 plus per year to attract “qualified” employees, yet this episode reads like a high school soap opera – bad communication, bad management, bad training, and bad execution. (As a sidebar, it appears that they never did obtain legal advice justifying the take down of the tents, or at least I did not see what the advice was in the report.)
Spicuzza is the real weak leak throughout the report – errors of commission and ommission. Castro is the one voice of reason. Interesting when Castro requested alternatives to the immediate tent take down during the conferece call – silence from the $200,000 plus folks.”
Very good point!
Jeff Boone: “The facts around UCD management and UCD law enforcement at that time were that these protests could get out of hand. I’m not defending the actions of either, but this mindset was certainly a factor and it deserves greater consideration.”
Absolutely!
Elaine
“any call for delay should have been to wait until the cover of night, and removed the protestors/tents quietly under the cover of darkness when fewer students were around to gather as a mob in support, and when cameras were not around.”
I am very concerned about advocacy for police actions done “under the cover of dark” and when “cameras are not around. While I agree this would have the advantage of not attracting a crowd, it would have the disadvantage of allowing the police to act with a complete lack of transparency. And as these investigations clearly demonstrate. Police action, even in broad daylight is not necessarily judicious or lacking in harm, what might they resort to if they felt their actions would not be discovered or reported.
Tapes related to “strip searches” from a separate recent thread would seem to indicate that citizens are not as safe from inappropriate police behavior as some seem to believe.
To medwoman: I understand your concern, but from a legal perspective, camping at night was the illegal action, and so the students themselves determined the timeframe when the police needed to move in – at night. Secondly, to effect removal at 3pm in the afternoon is just asking for trouble – something the police well understood. The afternoon timeframe posed a danger not only to police, but to the students themselves – as evidenced by the escalation of the protest, and the use of pepper spray. When crowds start to gather, a mob mentality is more likely to rule the day. It becomes a risk/benefit analysis. I suspect a nighttime removal would have been far safer for everyone concerned in this instance…
There are many pros and cons for removing the tents either at night or during the day. Since we are all being Monday morning quarterbacks, I think removal just as it is starting to get light outside might be the best option. You avoid the crowds, which could be a security and safety issue for all involved, yet you aren’t catching people in the dead of night when they can’t see and are more likely to be disoriented and do something that might be interpreted as aggressive by the UCD Police. The visibility allows more to see what is going on, and despite the fact it isn’t still night time, the police can fairly and accurately say that the tents had been up during the night. (Photo documentation could help support this, if deemed necessary.)
The bottom line is that I haven’t seen or heard the evidence that in my mind condemns Katehi’s decision to have the tents removed during the afternoon. I certainly don’t rely upon the UCD Police leadership to make that determination given their belief that riot gear would be necessary and that violence or active resistance would be expected. Does the Kroll report opine on this with the foundational assumption that appears to be Katehi’s that no force would be utilized? I think Katehi should fairly be blamed for not being clearer or more explicit about what she meant by not wanting “another Berkeley” sort of situation, if there truly was confusion as to what she meant, rather than individuals chosing to recollect things differently for whatever reason.
Re: newshoundpm
The report only documented the brief mention of not another Berkeley (100/190), but based on the dialogs collected in the report, Spicuzza had the closest understanding of what Katehi wanted:
On page 89/190:
[quote]Chief Spicuzza and the Lieutenants discussed the use of batons and pepper spray, with Spicuzza saying that she didn’t want them to be used. According to Garcia-Hernandez, “Both the Lieutenants echoed back to her, “nobody wants to do that. But we can’t predict if we’re gonna have to use them.” Although she cautioned that she couldn’t speak for Chief Spicuzza, Garcia-Hernandez believed that the Lieutenants made Chief Spicuzza aware that both pepper ball guns and pepper spray were among the less-lethal weapons that they would have at their disposal. In response, Chief Spicuzza “lifted her hand up off the table, waved to them, like, ‘No, no. We don’t wanna use that kinda thing.’” The Lieutenants replied “we
know we’re not supposed to use it, but … it’s the less lethal tool that we have.” Spicuzza replied “Yeah, yeah, I understand” and the conversation moved on to the mutual aid response.
…
Also that night, Chief Spicuzza told the Lieutenants that she didn’t want them wearing helmets and face shields, or “riot gear, as she called it,” according to Garcia-Hernandez. The Lieutenants replied, “you cannot tell somebody to walk into a situation like that without their safety gear” and called her suggestion “ridiculous.”[/quote]
According to Pike’s report: (99/190)
[quote]“During our meeting with the Chief of Police, the Chief stated that she did not want the officers carrying their wood batons or wearing their ballistic/protective helmets. The Chief referenced the incidents from the previous week at UC Berkeley wherein the UCBPD officers were videod taped [sic] using their batons against the resisting student
activists/occupiers. The Chief of Police opined that the sight of riot gear could increase the potential of the use of force or resistance from the protesters.”[/quote]
{100/190}:
[quote]The Chief of Police adamantly stated that she did not want excessive force to be used to remove the tents and she ordered that and I handle the removal of the tents personally. The Chief directed us not to get into a ‘tugging match’ with the protesters/occupiers and that if the protesters began to tussle with us over the tents to let the protesters just have the tents.”[/quote](Please continue to read till the end of page 100/190.)
During the eviction on Nov18: (109/190)
[quote]According to Deborah Hammond, the executive assistant to Chief Spicuzza, she was sitting with the chief in her car on the edge of the Quad before the police action. Hammond overheard a conversation between Chief Spicuzza and in which he told her, “’we’ll be in formation, we’ll be wearing shields’ … and she was very upset. She asked, ‘why do we need to be in formation?’ He responded with something about ‘regulation or procedure.’”
According to Karen Nikos, a senior public information representative for UC Davis who was assigned to stay with Chief Spicuzza on November 18, while the officers were staged on Shields Avenue West, the Chief called them on her cell phone and said, “that looks really
bad, I don’t want to come in here like an army. Could you change that?” And they apparently told her, “no.” Then Chief Spicuzza said “this looks bad. I don’t want to come in here forcefully. I want this to be very”—Nikos was unsure if she used the word “gentle” but she was kind of indicating that. Then Chief Spicuzza turned to Nikos and said, “you know, there’s a limit to what I can do, because they have training that tells them to do things a certain way.”
According to Nikos, Chief Spicuzza called the officers a second time, saying “could you spread out a little at least please?” As the students circled the tents, they were saying to each other “we’re keeping the police out.” Chief Spicuzza said “oh dear.”[/quote]
My interpretation is that the police understood what Katehi wanted, but at the same time did not believe the event would turn out as what she expected.