LOS ANGELES, CA — The California Supreme Court has ruled that Los Angeles City’s enforcement of Penal Code section 148.6(a), which criminalized knowingly false complaints against peace officers, violates the First Amendment because it chills protected speech and disproportionately targets criticism of police. The decision raises new constitutional and policy concerns about how government entities handle public complaints of officer misconduct.
The case, L.A. Police Protective League v. City of L.A., centered on whether the government may compel complainants to sign a warning stating that submitting a false complaint is a crime. A police union previously sought an injunction requiring enforcement of the statute after the City of Los Angeles stopped including the advisory warning in misconduct forms.
The Los Angeles County Superior Court initially granted the injunction, determining it was bound by the California Supreme Court’s earlier ruling in People v. Stanistreet, which upheld the constitutionality of Penal Code section 148.6(a). The California Court of Appeal affirmed the decision based on Stanistreet, despite conflicting federal rulings including Chaker v. Crogan and Hamilton v. City of San Bernardino, which found the statute unconstitutional under the First Amendment.
The California Supreme Court revisited its prior holding in light of later U.S. Supreme Court decisions, including United States v. Alvarez and Free Speech Coalition, Inc. v. Paxton. The Court held that section 148.6(a) is a content-based regulation within a category of potentially proscribable speech—defamation—but, in practice, it suppresses protected speech by deterring truthful or well-intentioned complaints of police misconduct.
The Court applied intermediate scrutiny and determined that the statute was not narrowly tailored to serve the government’s interests and burdened substantially more speech than necessary. The Court reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeal and remanded the case for further proceedings.
The California Supreme Court’s decision invalidated Penal Code section 148.6(a) in full, ruling that it violates free speech protections by disproportionately targeting negative speech about police. The statute made it a crime to file a knowingly false allegation of police misconduct.
Penal Code section 148.6(a)(1) criminalized knowingly false complaints and section 148.6(a)(2) required complainants to sign an advisory acknowledging potential criminal prosecution. The Los Angeles Police Protective League sued the city to compel enforcement after the city stopped using the advisory based on federal case law declaring the statute unconstitutional. Lower courts ruled for the League, citing the California Supreme Court’s earlier 2002 decision in People v. Stanistreet, which had upheld the statute.
Justice Groban authored the majority opinion and explicitly overruled Stanistreet, holding that section 148.6(a) “unconstitutionally burdens protected speech.” Although false statements are not fully protected, the Court reaffirmed that laws restricting them must be narrowly tailored. The statute failed because it criminalized only one category of false speech—allegations against police—while allowing knowingly false statements favorable to police.
The Court found that the statute chilled legitimate complaints by forcing complainants to sign a criminal warning. It applied asymmetrically, punishing critics of police but not supporters. It was poorly defined, failing to specify which false statements triggered liability, and it lacked any requirement of material harm or intent to defraud. The Court concluded these flaws collectively discouraged truthful or well-intentioned reports of misconduct.
Even under intermediate scrutiny—a lower constitutional burden—the law still failed tailoring requirements. The Court concluded it “burdens substantially more speech than necessary to further the government’s legitimate interests.”
The Court relied on several major precedents issued after Stanistreet, including R.A.V. v. St. Paul (1992), holding viewpoint discrimination unconstitutional even within unprotected speech; United States v. Alvarez (2012), holding false statements may only be punished when narrowly defined; Free Speech Coalition v. Paxton (2025), requiring heightened scrutiny even for regulations involving unprotected speech when they affect protected speech; and Davenport v. Washington Educ. Ass’n (2007), which permits only minimal-risk regulations to avoid heightened judicial review.
The ruling means Penal Code 148.6(a)(1) and its advisory requirement under 148.6(a)(2) can no longer be enforced. Police departments statewide may not compel complainants to sign criminal warnings, and California’s position is now aligned with the Ninth Circuit’s 2005 ruling in Chaker v. Crogan, which found the same statute unconstitutional.
Justice Liu dissented. He emphasized the state’s interest in protecting peace officers from malicious false claims and argued that the statute should have survived intermediate scrutiny.
The Court invalidated Penal Code section 148.6(a) and held that criminalizing only false statements against police officers—combined with a mandatory advisory—violates the First Amendment because it deters oversight, chills public criticism, and discourages legitimate complaints.
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